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British Collective Bargaining: 
The Challenges of the 1970's 
Robert F. Banks 
In the i960's BritairCs traditional industry-wide col-
lective bargaining System was modified significantly by the 
growth of local bargaining, the introduction of an incomes 
policy and government recommendations for the gênerai 
reform of industrial relations. Other important innovations 
were long term agreements, status agreements and pro-
ductivity bargaining. The Conservative Governmenfs new 
Industrial Relations Act will hâve a significant impact on 
the industrial relations system, particularly with regard io 
union récognition, internai unions affairs and the protection 
of the rights of individual employées. However, the Acfs 
restrictions on the right to strike are likely to hâve only a 
minimal impact on established bargaining relationships. As 
Great Britain enters the 1970's the industrial relations 
system's main challenge is for unions and management to 
voluntarily respond to the problems which continue to be 
posed by the uncoordinated growth of plant bargaining. 
The reform of industrial relations was one of the major issues in 
Great Britain's June, 1970, gênerai élection in which the Conservative 
Party defeated the encumbent Labour Government. Its prominence 
reflects substantial public concern about the inflationary conséquences 
of collective bargaining and Britain's high incidence of unofficial strikes. 
More specifically, the issue of industrial relations reform has been kept 
in the public eye in récent years; 
i.e., since 1968 several important 
policy documents on industrial rela-
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tions hâve been published in Great Britain *. The most substantial of 
them was the report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers' Associations which was the product of a three-year detailed 
review of British industrial relations. The Labour and Conservative 
Governments' White Papers are equally important as they specified the 
policies of Britain's two major political parties for the reform of industrial 
relations. In particular, the Conservative's new industrial relations propo-
sais resulted in extensive disagreement and controversy in the House of 
Commons and in Great Britain generally. 
In varying degrees, ail thèse documents share as a central thème 
the view that the government should become more actively, directly and 
deeply involved in the industrial relations System. This view, of course, 
sharply contrasts with Britain's traditional public policy of « collective 
laissez-faire » in industrial relations — with the Government acting as 
a neutral third party « holding the ring between management and unions ». 
Although we might assess the 1960's and 1970's as a key period for 
public policy toward industrial relations and in the development of col-
lective bargaining in the United Kingdom, it is a grave mistake to evaluate 
thèse policy proposais independent of an historical context. To a significant 
degree they are a resuit of at least a decade's extensive debate which 
produced a substantial indictment of British industrial relations. More-
over, in response to such criticism and independent of thèse « grand 
design » proposais for industrial relations reform, since 1960 a number 
of significant changes hâve occurred in the British collective bargaining 
system as a resuit of spécifie initiatives by management, unions and 
particularly by the government. In keeping with British traditions thèse 
innovations hâve been reformist and evolutionary ; and, their objective — 
the modernization of British industrial relations — is yet to be achieved. 
Nevertheless, as Britain enters the 1970's, thèse developments hâve had 
a significant and lasting impact on the collective bargaining system. 
1 The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers1 Associations, 1965-
68, H.M.S.O., London, Cmnd. 3623, June 1968 : The Conservative Political Centre, 
Fair Deal at Work: The Conservative Approach to Modem Industrial Relations, 
London, April 1968 ; The Wilson Administration^ In Place of Strife : A Policy for 
Industrial Relations, Cmnd. 3888, H.M.S.O., London, January 1969 ; and the Heath 
Administration^ Industrial Relations Bill: Consultative Document, Department of 
Employment and Productivity, October 1970. 
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The Traditional Collective Bargaining System 
Before examining thèse developments, a brief review of Britain's 
traditional wage détermination System supplies a background against which 
the scope and implications of thèse changes can be evaluated. 
In the postwar period the main features of Britain's traditional 
collective bargaining System can be outlined as follows 2. 
1. The most prominent characteristic of Britain's System of wage 
détermination remains voluntary industrywide bargaining with 
most major industries covered by national agreements negotiated 
between an employers' association and one or more unions. 
Collective bargaining is more complète and formally structured 
in public than in private employment, with national agreements 
covering the Civil Service, health service employées, teachers, 
other local government employées, and the workers employed 
by the main nationalized industries. Some 500 national bargaining 
structures cover between 75 and 80 percent of Britain's working 
population. 
2. Approximately four million additional employées are covered by 
statutory wage-fixing machinery under the Agricultural Wages 
Act, 1948, and the Wages Council Act, 1959. Currently 56 
tripartite wages councils exist in a variety of industries and are 
empowered to issue legally binding awards on ail firms within 
the scope of their jurisdictions. Thèse awards are considered to 
be only minimum wages and conditions and are not intended 
to discourage other negotiations that provide better terms and 
conditions, nor to substitute for voluntary collective bargaining. 
3. The diversity of British collective bargaining procédures reflects 
the complex structure of organizations which negotiate labor 
agreements. In 1969, 508 labor unions in Britain had a combinée 
membership of roughly ten million. This total is approximately 
2
 In addition to the sources cited above, key références describing Britain's 
traditional collective bargaining system are : B.C. Roberts (Ed.), Industrial Re-
lations : Contemporary Problems and Perspectives, Methuen, London, 1968 (revised 
édition) ; Written Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers' Associations, H.M.S.O., London, 1965 ; and Allan FLANDERS, 
Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the System, Faber and Faber, London, 
1965. 
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40 percent of the labor force ; and 149 of thèse unions, with 
a membership of more than nine million, are affiliated to the 
Trades Union Congress. The British labor movement has craft, 
industrial and gênerai unions, but more than 70 percent of ail 
members belong to nineteen unions with memberships of 100,000 
or more and the four largest are gênerai unions sharing roughly 
one-third of ail unionists. 
4. Some 14,000 employer associations also exist in Britain ; but 
a few, such as the Engineering Employers' Fédération and the 
National Fédération of Building Trades Employers, are dominant 
in collective bargaining. In 1965, the Confédération of British 
Industry was established as the main national employers' asso-
ciation, but this new central body still has less influence over 
its affiliâtes' collective bargaining policies than the TUC has 
over its member organizations. 
5. British collective agreements differ substantively from American 
practice, as they are typically open-ended and quite narrow in 
scope. In extrême cases they cover only basic wages, hours of 
work and vacations ; fringe benefits, too, are much less extensive 
than in the U.S.A. 
6. In many industries issues such as safety, health, welfare, and 
other issues affecting industrial efficiency are not covered by 
collective agreements, but rather are discussed through joint 
consultation. Thèse procédures, which vary in effectiveness, are 
based on the view that one can differentiate between collective 
bargaining, which implies the possibility of conflict between 
parties, and joint consultation, which is concerned with issues 
in the common interest of both sides. 
7. Finally, the British system of industrial relations gives priority 
both to collective bargaining over ail other methods of pay dé-
termination and to voluntary over compulsory procédural rules 
for the régulation of its conduct. Before 1971 employers were 
not legally required to recognize or negotiate with trade unions 
and there was no code of « unfair labor practices » that could 
be legally enforced against either party. Further, collective agree-
ments were not binding in the courts ; so that no légal action 
could be taken against either party solely on the grounds that 
a breach of collective agreement occured. 
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The Growth of Local Bargaining 
By the end of the 1960's, thèse features of Britain's traditional collec-
tive bargaining System were still operational ; but since 1945, tlie bar-
gaining environment has changed dramatically and the économie and 
institutional rationale for industry wide bargaining has been seriously 
challenged. As a resuit, particularly in the 1960's, the structure of 
collective bargaining was decentralized in response to local issues and 
worker aspirations not dealt with in national agreements. In most; of the 
important sectors of British industry, including the métal trades, automobile 
manufacturing, coal mining, the docks and shipbuilding, national agree-
ments were extensively supplemented by local bargains negotiated by 
plant management and shop stewards. 
The économie significance of local bargaining is difficult to measure 
precisely because such agreements are usually negotiated informally without 
participation by the national unions and employers' associations. However, 
one useful — if indirect — measure is the phenomenon of wage drift ; 
the measure of the extent to which hourly earnings hâve increased more 
rapidly than wage rates. British data for the postwar period confirais 
the importance of wage drift ensuing from locally negotiated payments 
of various kinds even after those portions of the earnings gap which 
were demand determined or a resuit of substantial amounts of overtime 
work are excluded3. 
Equally important has been the phenomenon of « condition drift » 
which is the resuit of local negotiations on working conditions, including 
work patterns, the extent and distribution of overtime work and the 
utilization of manpower. The growth of plant bargaining has also cons-
trained managerial rights in the enterprise ; lay-offs, discharges, worker 
discipline and similar issues hâve been increasingly subjected to joint 
rules and procédures informally agreed between plant management and 
shop stewards. Finally, in many firms, joint consultative machinery has 
been transformed into plant negotiating bodies, while in others thèse 
consultative bodies simply hâve been by-passed. 
The gênerai developments responsible for this dramatic growth of 
plant bargaining since 1945 are numerous and varied, but several gênerai 
3 The Report of the Royal Commission, op. cit., pp. 14-15 features a dis-
cussion of « wage drift » and the « earnings gap ». 
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factors can be cited. Tight labor markets hâve enhanced union bargaining 
power and the gênerai inflationary climate has reduced employer résistance 
to local wage demands. The distinctive features of certain mass production 
technologies, commonly found in the automobile and engineering industries, 
also hâve provided the basis for the stratégie use of bargaining power by 
particular Workgroups, as has the extent to which particular firms hâve 
decentralized decision-making procédures and operate in localized and 
unique product and labor markets4. 
Another factor has been management's acceptance of plant negot-
iations to supply agreements reached quickly with shop stewards who are 
involved directiy with its application in the plant without formai restrictions 
on managerial rights. Finally, a close relationship exists between the 
growth of local bargaining and particular types of wage structures 
employed. In those industries in which the percentage of wage earners 
on payment-by-results is highest there are extensive opportunities for an 
increase in workplace earnings and a wider scope for local negotiations 5. 
Thus, plant bargaining has become a de facto feature of the collective 
bargaining System. Indeed, it has achieved improvements in workers' living 
standards and an extension of workplace democracy. Moreover, many 
managers now recognize the importance of plant labor relations and the 
need to win workers' support for change rather than using traditional 
authoritarian methods. However, against thèse positive features hâve to 
be set a number of prominent disadvantages. Because plant bargaining 
has emerged in an unplanned and haphazard way, both employers and 
unions at the local level hâve modified industry-wide agreements by 
uncoordinated pay settlements, which are often both inflationary and 
distort plant pay structures. Moreover, in some instances plant relation-
ships hâve deteriorated to a situation of more-or-less permanent industrial 
warfare. 
4
 For a more detailed review of thèse factors see B.C. ROBERTS and John 
GENNARD, « Trends in Plant and Company Bargaining », The Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 2, June 1970, pp. 147-166 and H.A. TURNER, 
« Collective Bargaining and the Eclipse of Incomes Policy : Retrospect, Prospect 
and Possibilities », The British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 2, 
July 1970, pp. 203-206. 
5 A récent survey by the National Board for Priées and Incomes revealed that 
strong support remains in management circles for incentive Systems of wage payment. 
See N.B.P.I., Report No. 65 : Payment by Results Schemes, H.M.S.O., May 1968. 
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During the last décade support has grown for a coordinated de-
centralized bargaining system. In particular, this development, as discussed 
below, has been fostered by the Royal Commission's report and the 
emphasis on productivity bargaining in the Labour Government's incomes 
policy. In addition, both sides of British industry hâve tried to respond to 
the implications of this new bargaining structure. The trade union move-
ment as a whole has improved its financial position and the larger unions 
hâve taken steps to increase the number of their full-time officiais, to 
train their workplace représentatives more adequately and to adapt their 
structures to the challenge of local bargaining. Moreover, since 1962 
the TUC has been more vigorous in pursuing an amalgamation policy. 
For example, since 1958 the number of trade unions has fallen from 675 
to 508 and by early in 1970 more than 40 unions had informed the TUC 
of their involvement in amalgamation discussions. In particular, Britain's 
three giant gênerai workers' unions especially hâve been involved in thèse 
merger activities and the new, more militant leadership of the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers and the Transport and General Workers' 
Union formally has supported local bargaining activities. 
On management's side, particularly in those large firms emerging 
as a resuit of the industrial mergers of récent years, the desirability of 
company bargaining and the need for appropriate management policies 
to adapt work practices and payment Systems to modem industrial 
conditions hâve been recognized. Moreover, the status of the personnel 
management function has been improved and industrial relations problems 
generally hâve received greater attention. Finally, since 1960 dramatic 
improvements hâve been made in the extent and quality of management 
éducation which will improve the compétence of British management in 
the future 6. 
However, further fundamental reforms are clearly necessary before 
an effective plant bargaining system can émerge. In spite of developments 
in récent years, both British unions and employers hâve been equally 
slow to recognize the growing irrelevance of industry-wide bargaining. 
The unions' financial position remains weak, their officiais overworked, 
and their research and educational facilities underdeveloped. Moreover, 
the structure of the labor movement remains complex, irrational and 
largely unsuited to a coordinated system of plant bargaining. 
6
 According to Mr. John Marsh, Director-General of the British Institute of 
Management, since 1962, apart from the establishment of two new business schools, 
25 universities hâve introduced more than 40 différent Master's degrees in manage-
ment and business studies. Quoted in The Financial Times, 22 April 1968. 
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A major problem is that unions' représentative in the plant — the 
shop steward — usually has no clearly defined rôle in the national nego-
tiating process, in his relations with plant management or in the union 
hierarchy. As a local bargainer, the shop steward has no commitment 
to a national agreement, which may be marginally relevant to his plant. 
His primary loyalty is to his local constituents, and his major rôle is to 
improve their pay and working conditions. Moreover, although some 
managements informally accord the steward the status of a full-time union 
officiai, many firms closely restrict the shop steward's functions or do 
not grant any kind of récognition. In addition, managerial acceptance 
dépends largely on the degree of unionization in the plant and the 
stewards' personal qualities. Only rarely are the stewards' rôle and 
functions the subject of a formai agreement between the national unions 
and management or the employers' association concerned. Usually shop 
stewards do not hâve the full status of a union officiai and most union 
rules do not clearly spell out their duties or responsibilities 7. 
However, even assuming an effective restructuring of the steward's 
rôle, the unions would still be confronted with major organizational 
difficulties at the workplace. Plant bargaining has created common 
organizational and negotiating needs, which because of the existence of 
multi-unionism in many firms, hâve resulted in the establishment of joint 
committees on which normally ail the shop stewards in a plant are re-
presented. Commonly, a senior steward or « convenor » leads the workers' 
side in negotiations affecting ail the plant's employées. Although thèse 
bodies perform important negotiating functions, they are not responsible 
officially to the union structure in the workplace or at higher levels. 
This organizational problem has been compounded further by the establish-
ment in the automobile and engineering industries of shop steward 
combine committees made up of plant représentatives within prominent 
multi-unit firms. Thèse bodies often provide a logical platform for the 
coordination of the bargaining demands of workers in a multi-union 
multi-plant situation, but again, they exist independently of the formai 
structure of the union movement. Because of this independence and a 
significant degree of Communist influence thèse committees are not 
formally recognized by the unions or management, but in practice their 
functional importance is acknowledged as both parties hâve turned a 
blind eye to their activities. 
7 The basic référence hère is W.E.J. MCCARTHY in The Rôle of Shop Stewards 
in British Industrial Relations, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' 
Associations, Research Paper No. 1, H.M.S.O., London, 1966. 
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British management has an equal responsibility for the unsatisfactory 
state of industrial relations at the enterprise level. Conflict has been gene-
rated by managements apparent willingness to reward aggressive behavior. 
Often, management has rejected claims supported by full-time union 
officiais, only to grant concessions to shop stewards in the face of threat-
ened industrial action. In addition, slow-moving dispute seulement pro-
cédures also hâve encouraged unofficial strikes which often résolve issues 
more quickly than the formai procédures. 
Thèse spécifie criticisms are a gênerai reflection of the extent to 
which British management has neglected the human factor in industry. 
While top management is deeply involved in solving human relations pro-
blems arising out of décisions taken on technical or économie grounds, 
little effort has been made to acquire the skills necessary for their effective 
long-range solution. Until recently the main sélection criterion for manage-
ment posts has been the need for expertise in financial and production 
activities. Personnel management has a low status in the British manage-
ment hierarchy, meaning that labor problems are often dealt with on an 
ad hoc basis after fundamental production or technical décisions hâve been 
made. Only in the last few years has British management slowly recognized 
that the challenge of workplace bargaining must be met by a dramatic 
improvement in the status of the personnel function, and the deep involve-
ment of executives at ail levels in the problems of industrial relations 
management8. 
8
 This section has explicitly focused on the development of informai local 
bargaining by blue collar workers. However, in the last décade there has been a 
dramatic growth in the unionization of white collar workers, especially foremen, 
technicians and office workers and the spread of collective agreements, largely, 
although not exclusively, covering individual plants and companies. Such growth 
has mainly occured in the private sector - white collar unionism and collective 
bargaining has a long history in the public sector - and a leader in thèse efforts is 
The Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, which as a resuit 
of its merger and organizational activities is one of Britain's fastest growing unions. 
Although the density of white collar unionism remains low - the most récent com-
prehensive estimate is for 1964, showing only one-third of white collar employées 
organized, with the vast majority in the public sector - substantial growth has 
occurred in engineering, automobile production and gênerai manufacturing as well 
as in banking and insurance. The introduction of governmentally sponsored union 
récognition procédures is likely to extend unionization and collective bargaining to 
white collar workers. See G.S. BAIN, «Trade Union Growth and Récognition». 
Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, Research Paper 
No. 6, H.M.S.O., London, 1967 and The Growth of White Collar Unionism, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1970. 
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The Changing Rôle of Government 
The most significant development in British labor relations in récent 
décades is government intervention in the economy and the collective bar-
gaining System. This phenomenon represents a substantial modification 
of the traditional British view that the industrial relations System functions 
most effectively through a gênerai guarantee of autonomy to both sides 
of industry with minimum involvement by the State or the law. 
The government's rôle in managing the economy has been extensive. 
Heavy reliance has been placed on monetary and fiscal policies, together 
with a panoply of related measures to stimulate higher rates of économie 
growth and to combat inflation and the balance of payments problem. 
Régional économie policies also were developped to attract industry to de-
pressed areas and to encourage the transfer of manpower to areas of high 
labor demand. Moreover, since the early 1960's the government and both 
sides of industry hâve been committed to a program of indicative planning. 
A tripartite National Economie Development Council was established in 
1962 as a forum for national dialogue on économie planning and it 
approved the Labour Government's national économie plan which was 
prepared in 1965 by the newly established Ministry of Economie Affairs. 
Although Britain's dire économie circumstances since 1966 forced an 
abandonment of the plan's targets, the government has continued to sup-
port a modest économie planning program. 
In the industrial relations arena the government has intervened in 
several important areas. First, in the last twenty years ail British govern-
ments hâve developed incomes policies to achieve a closer link between 
money income increases and the rise in national productivity, thus miti-
gating the impact of rising wage costs on the gênerai price level and the 
balance of payments. The impact of thèse policies is examined in more 
détail in a later section of this article. 
In addition, in the face of persistent national labor shortages, régional 
labor surpluses, and abundant évidence that manpower is being under-
utilized in British industry, the government is now committed to an active 
labor market policy. This has included such innovations as an improved 
system of labor exchanges, mobility allowances for workers in depressed 
régions, increases in the level of unemployment compensation, an expan-
sion in the number and enrollment capacity of government training centers, 
and the development of forecasts of the future supply, demand and quality 
of manpower undertaken by the various government departments, 
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In particular, since 1963, new législation was introduced relating to 
three key aspects of the employment relationship - dismissal notification, 
industrial training and severance pay - largely because of the failure of 
unions and management to voluntarily develop effective joint policies in 
thèse areas. The Contracts of Employment Act of 1963 stipulâtes mini-
mum periods of notice for both employers and employées to terminate 
contracts of unemployment. The Industrial Training Act of 1964 reorgan-
ized the System of industrial training by bringing it under the jurisdiction 
of a tripartite training board for each major industry whose opérations 
are financed by levies on covered employers. The Redundancy Payments 
Act of 1965 provides for financial compensation to most workers, who 
are dismissed because their services are no longer required. Payments 
under the Act vary according to âge, length of service and the size of past 
average weekly pay 9. 
Intervention in Collective Bargaining 
The government has also intervened directly into the collective bar-
gaining process with such moves being justified by the public's growing 
dissatisfaction with the level and extent of industrial conflict in British 
industry. True, some industrial relations experts, i.e., Professor Turner 
of Cambridge University, hâve argued that Britain's strike record is over-
emphasized at the expense of concern over cost inflation and industrial 
inefficiency. Nevertheless, a review of Britain's postwar strike record does 
substantiate such public concern : 10 
1. While the annual number of mandays lost through strikes has ra-
rely risen above 3 million, the annual frequency of strikes has 
risen since 1945. 
2. Until the late 1950's Britain's strike record was dominated by 
coal mining strikes, but their sharp décline since then has been 
9
 For a lucid survey of the British Government's manpower programs, see 
ILO, Labour and Automation, Bulletin No. 4, Manpower Adjustment Programs : 
1. France, Fédéral Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Geneva, 1967, pp. 133-
207, and Organization for Economie Coopération and Development, Manpower 
Policy in the United Kingdom. O.E.C.D., Paris, 1970. 
!0 A detailed review of the trends, causes and conséquences of strike activity 
in postwar Britain may be found in : J.F.B. Goodman, « Strikes in the United 
Kingdom : Récent Statistics and Trends », The International Labour Review, Vol. 95, 
No. 5, May 1967, pp. 465-81; H.A. TURNER, IS Britain Really Strike-Prone ? 
Department of Applied Economies Occasional Paper No. 20, Cambridge University 
Press, 1969 ; and W.E.J. MCCARTHY, « The Nature of Britain's Strike Problem », 
The British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 2, July 1970, pp. 224-236. 
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offset by a rising incidence of industrial conflict in key industrial 
sectors, including automobile manufacturing, engineering, cons-
truction, port employment and shipbuilding. 
3. The typical localized short duration strike has also been supple-
mented by a variety of other forms of industrial action including 
go-slows, work-to-rules and overtime bans in récent years. 
4. Large-scale officiai national strikes in the postwar period hâve 
been used mainly for démonstrative purposes rather than to impose 
extensive losses on employers in industrywide bargaining. 
5. As a resuit of the growing capital intensity and inter-dependence 
of the British economy, leaders of both major parties argue that 
the économie impact of strikes has grown significantly. 
6. Approximately 95 percent of ail strikes are not officially called 
by the unions, and the great majority are also unconstitutional in 
that they occur before the existing procédures for settling disputes 
hâve been exhausted. 
7. Through the 1950's strikes over pieeework, wage structure issues, 
variations in working conditions and rules, supervision and dis-
cipline dominated in Britain. Since 1960, the number of disputes 
over claims for wage increases has increased sharply, reflecting 
both the décline in coal mining strikes and the growing ins-
titutionalization of informai plant bargaining. 
While the majority of disputes are settled peacefully through local 
negotiations, thèse trends in industrial conflict demonstrate the lack of 
effective plant level procédures in British industry. Unofficial strikes are 
used to achieve quick solutions to workplace problems because of the 
slowness of dispute settlement procédures. Moreover, in a period of full 
employment the costs of such limited industrial action are minimal to the 
strikers. 
As already observed, normally there are no arrangements in British 
industry for third-party arbitration of plant level disputes, since both 
unions and management would rather settle local issues themselves with 
the maximum degree of informality and flexibility n. The major third-
11
 However, there are extensive procédures available for the arbitration of 
industry-wide industrial disputes. British law and many collective agreements provide 
for voluntary arbitration at the request of both parties by a permanent tribunal 
- the Industrial Court - or by ad hoc arbitration bodies selected by the parties or 
appointed by the Ministry of Labour. In addition, separate standing arbitration 
bodies exist in the Civil Service, the Railways and coal mining. 
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party rôle in the conciliation of industrial disputes in Britain is played by 
the Ministry of Employment. Under the Conciliation and Industrial Courts 
Acts, of 1896 and 1919, respectively, the Ministry may provide conciliation 
services, although normally at the request of both parties. The Ministry 
is also empowered to establish courts of inquiry or committees of invest-
igation for particular disputes or more far ranging studies of gênerai in-
dustrial relations problems. Most investigations hâve been confined to 
particular disputes and in a large proportion of cases, thèse inquiries hâve 
provided a basis for seulement. However, the Ministry's dispute seulement 
rôle reflects the traditional British view that it should be secondary to 
voluntary collective bargaining, and, therefore, be employed infrequently, 
at the request of both parties and as a last resort. 
Since the early 1960's the adequacy of this approach has been quest-
ioned and the Ministry has intervened more in collective bargaining. One 
new approach is a more extensive use of inquiries to make detailed exa-
minations of industrial relations in particular industries. For example, since 
1964 the recommendations of such inquiries in passenger transport, cons-
truction, shipping and shipbuilding hâve encouraged significant changes 
in industrial relations practices and procédures. Another récent innovation 
is the Ministry's establishment of a Manpower and Productivity Service 
to provide free consultations to management concerning improved man-
power utilization and industrial efficiency. There has been a substantial 
response to this new service, probably because the Ministry's régional 
industrial relations officers simply provided their existing clients with 
consultative assistance in their new capacity as « Manpower Advisors. » 
During its brief existence, the Service has demonstrated its usefulness, 
although its long run effectiveness will require a more précise définition 
of its functions and its closer coordination with other Ministry functions 12. 
12
 In addition, in 1964 the Ministry proposed the establishment of ad hoc 
tripartite fact-finding teams to inquire into selected unofficial strikes. However, both 
the Trades Union Congress and the British Employers' Confédération (which merged 
into the Confédération of British Industry in 1965) rejected this proposai and 
decided to establish their own bipartite investigatory scheme for unofficial strikes. 
The results of thèse investigations demonstrate the périls of voluntarism. After great 
difficulty in jointly selecting which disputes should be investigated, nine case studies 
of strikes were completed by the middle of 1966. Finally, a gênerai report based on 
thèse studies was published in May 1968, which concluded that disputes could be 
avoided if the managements concerned had developed positive industrial relations 
policies, including adéquate consultation with employées, and if workers strictly 
adhered to the provisions of disputes procédures. See Investigation of Strikes: 
Report by the CBI and TUC, London, 1968. 
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In particular, in two notorious industrial relations trouble spots - the 
motor industry and the docks - government intervention has been extensive 
and on a continuing basis. In the postwar period automobile manufacturing 
has become Britain's most strike-prone industry, with a labor relations 
history clearly demonstrating ail the defects of the British industrial rela-
tions system 13. Consequently, since the early 1960's the government has 
urged unions and management to make improvements in the industry's 
industrial relations procédures. In 1965, the government established a 
tripartite Motor Industry Joint Labour Council under the chairmanship 
of Jack Scamp, the personnel director of the General Electric Company. 
The Council's function was to keep industrial relations in the industry 
under review and to inquire into disputes which resulted in unofficial 
strikes. 
As the Council's resources were modest, its investigatory rôle into 
individual strikes was confined to limited fire-brigade activities. However, 
its reports proposed improvements in the industry's disputes procédure 
and the establishment of new industry-wide negotiation machinery pro-
viding a framework for separate company and plant level bargaining. 
In the autumn of 1968, responding to an increased incidence of auto 
strikes the Government intervened again, which resulted in the establish-
ment of a new bipartite Joint Council for the Motor Industry which would 
focus on wage structure reform and the improvement of industrial relations 
procédures. 
Although the motor industry's strike incidence has risen drastically 
in récent years, government intervention has been a catalyst for limited 
reform. The Engineering Employers' Fédération is reviewing the implic-
ations of separate motor industry bargaining procédures ; the Rootes Group, 
a Chrysler affiliate, and British Leyland, Britain's largest motor firm, hâve 
disaffiliated from the EEF, thus joining Ford and Vauxhall as masters of 
their own labor relations policies ; and the industry's major producers are 
negotiating replacement of complicated piecework schemes by measured 
day work Systems. Closely related to thèse developments in the motor 
industry are the negotiations since 1969 for a reformed disputes seulement 
procédure in gênerai engineering. Hère the employer and union fédérations 
hâve agreed to establish a new national industrial relations council to 
13 For an excellent review of motor industry labor relations see H.A. TURNER, 
Garfield CLACK and Geoffrey ROBERTS, Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1967. 
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negotiate minimum wages and gênerai conditions of employment for ail 
manual employées. However, thèse negotiations were very difficult, par-
ticularly as the resuit of the unions' insistence that management not be 
allowed to implement any disputed changes in wages or working conditions 
prior to a complète exhaustion of the procédure. 
Government intervention in dock labor relations has been even more 
extensive. In 1965 a committee of inquiry recommended immédiate ne-
gotiations to end the system of casual labor and restrictive work practices 
in the docks, as well as new national negotiating machinery, including in-
dependent public members, to ensure rapid progress toward the achieve-
ment of thèse goals. A tripartite National Modernization Committee was 
established immediately with a government appointed chairman and sub-
sequently reached agreement on a dock labor decasualization scheme in 
return for an eventual eradication of restrictive work practices14. 
Since the late 1960's further progress has been slow, with the ne-
gotiations on new wage structures and work rules reform protracted and 
difficult15. In spite of thèse modest reforms, less progress clearly would 
hâve been achieved without public intervention. AU negotiations were 
supported by substantial Government initiatives ; for example, the im-
plementation of labor decasualization ; improvements in fringe benefits 
and amenities in the industry, including nationally negotiated severance 
pay and retirement benefits for displaced and older dockers ; and a 
commitment to partially nationalize the docks. Government intervention 
has been a vital component in the quest for new approaches to the in-
dustry's labor problems. 
Such governmental intervention in the docks, the motor industry and 
elsewhere certainly was not the product of a comprehensive, gênerai stra-
tegy of industrial relations reform and, so far, thèse initiatives hâve achieved 
only Umited success. Yet, this new trend represents a significant modific-
14 The Final Report of the Committee of Inquiry Under the Rt. Hon. Lord 
Devlin into Certain Matters Concerning the Port Transport Industry, H.M.S.O., 
London, 1965, Cmnd. 2734. Also see, « Ending of Casual System of Working in 
the Docks», The Ministry of Labour Gazette, September 1967, pp. 709-711. 
!5 A gênerai view of current difficulties is presented in David Wilson, «Weak 
Negotiating Procédures Hamper Docks Modernization, » The Financial Times, 
(London), July 2, 1970. 
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ation of a traditional principle of British industrial relations - that of 
unquestioned public approval of unfettered private decision-making in 
the collective bargaining process. 
The Royal Commissions Report and Programs 
for Industrial Relations Reform 
Since 1969 both the Labour and Conservative Parties hâve issued 
« grand design » proposais for industrial relations reform, involving greater 
state intervention in the System 16. However, a review of the comprehensive 
report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' As-
sociations is a necessary prerequisite to their adéquate analysis. As its 
fundamental premise the Commission argued that the reform of industrial 
relations could be achieved through the voluntary efforts of unions and 
management. Thus, a major dual rôle for public policy was to extend 
voluntary collective bargaining and to achieve a reform of existing col-
lective bargaining procédures through detailed investigations of industrial 
relations practices by an independent review body. Changing the law to 
modify the behavior of unions or management was viewed only as an 
ad hoc method of reform to be used sparingly in limited instances and as 
a last resort if unions and management did not remedy the defects of the 
system themselves. 
More specifically, the report recommends a formai decentralization 
of the collective bargaining system through the establishment of com-
prehensive factory agreements covering ail procédural and substantive 
issues now covered by informai workplace negotiations. Such reform was 
to be encouraged by a new Industrial Relations Act requiring ail companies 
to register collective labor agreements with the Department of Employment, 
with its major objective to détermine which of them met established criteria 
for comprehensive factory agreements. 
An independent Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) also was 
proposed to investigate références to it by the Secretary of State for Em-
ployment concerning such problems as union récognition, the inadequacies 
16
 A convenient summary and review of thèse proposais, including the re-
commendations of the Royal Commission Report, are found in T.G. Whittingham 
and A. W. Gottschalk, « Proposais for Change in the British System of Industrial 
Relations - An Evaluation, » The Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 12, No. 1, 
March 1970, pp. 52-71. 
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of factory agreements, and wage structure and pay adjustment problems. 
The rôle of the CIR was seen not as an arbitration tribunal, but as a review 
body to bring about the long run reform of collective bargaining. No civil 
penalties were proposed to support the CIR's findings, for its main 
sanction was to be public opinion mobilized by its recommendations with 
the gênerai reform of collective bargaining encouraged by a dissémination 
of information about effective and sensible industrial relations practices. 
The Commission recommended assistance to unions to organize and 
negotiate effectively. Employers should not be allowed by law to prevent 
workers from joining unions, wages council procédures should encourage 
voluntary collective bargaining and the CIR should be empowered to exa-
mine cases concerning the non-recognition of unions. Again, no direct 
penalties were proposed against parties rejecting CIR recommendations. 
However, where union récognition was formally denied or where récogn-
ition was granted, but effective collective bargaining was impossible, the 
CIR might recommend that the union be allowed to refer the dispute to 
unilatéral arbitration, but the Commission saw this approach being used 
selectively and only to a limited degree. 
The report also included recommendations concerning the rights of 
individuals both as union members and employées. Regarding internai 
union democracy, key proposais were the amendment and clarification of 
internai union rules and procédures under the supervision of a new Chief 
Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and the establish-
ment of an independent appeals tribunal to which union members could 
make complaints against union malpractices. On the issue of employée 
rights, the Commission proposed législation guaranteeing workers the right 
of appeal against unfair dismissals to industrial tribunals, with ail currently 
existing tribunals being expanded into full-fledged labor courts with juris-
diction over virtually « ail disputes arising between employées and em-
ployer from their contracts of employment or from any statutory claims 
they may hâve against each other in their capacity as employées and 
employers. » 
The major question before the Royal Commission was whether col-
lective agreements should be transformed into legally binding contracts. 
Both the CBI and the Engineering Employers' Fédération supported this 
proposai in one form or another, a view widely shared in British manage-
ment circles, although resolutely opposed by the labor movement. How-
ever, the Commission's majority report rejected both legally binding con-
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tracts and procédure agreements or sanctions against individual strikers. 
The Commission argued that changes in the law on their own would do 
little to eradicate the root cause of Britain's strike problem, which was 
the inadequacy of current arrangements for workshop bargaining, and 
especially the absence of speedy, clearly-defined and effective disputes 
procédures. Thèse deficiencies could only be removed by a reform of 
collective bargaining through the establishment of comprehensive factory 
agreements. Only when voluntary reform efforts proved futile should any 
considération be given to the introduction of legally binding agreements. 
In view of the adversary character of its membership, many Com-
mission recommendations were compromises and its analysis had significant 
gaps. Nevertheless, the report présents a strong case for a basically vo-
luntary industrial relations System, together with public support for decent-
ralized bargaining procédures. Moreover, its proposais for union récogn-
ition, the régulation of internai union affairs and the protection of em-
ployées' rights in industry were constructive innovations. However, many 
critics questioned whether the Commission^ approach, which emphasized 
the importance of public scrutiny and improvement by example, was really 
equal to the urgent need for an extensive and immédiate reform of British 
labor relations 17. 
Early in 1969 the Labour Administration issued its « grand design » 
proposais in a White Paper, In Place of Strife, which accepted the Royal 
Commission's basic philosophy and almost ail of its recommendations. 
The most controversial aspect of the White Paper were new recommend-
ations concerning limitations on the right to strike. In Place of Strife re-
commended that the Minister of Employment be granted discretionary 
powers supported by financial penalties to order a back-to-work in serious 
unofficial strikes for a 28-day « Conciliation Pause » during which add-
itional Government peace initiatives could take place. Moreover, the 
Minister also could require that unions conduct national strike ballots 
prior to authorizing stoppages which posed a serious threat to the eco-
nomy or the public interest. Finally, in cases of inter-union récognition 
disputes if voluntary methods failed, the Minister could support with an 
17 For a survey of criticisms of the report see R.F. BANKS, « The Reform of 
British Industrial Relations : The Donovan Report and the Labour Government's 
Policy Proposais, » Relations Industrielles, Volume 24, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 333-
378 ; and the symposium on the Royal Commission Report in The British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. VT, No. 3, November 1968. 
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Order, backed up by financial penalties for non-compliance, recommend-
ations by the CIR that only a particular union or unions be recognized 18. 
Thèse proposais provoked violent opposition from the Labor Move-
ment and within the Labour Party itself. In particular, the TUC declared 
itself opposed to « Conciliation Pauses, » strike ballots and the ultimate 
use of compulsory arbitration in inter-union récognition disputes. Sub-
sequently, the Government postponed the new législation to await the 
décision of a spécial TUC delegate conférence on an alternative anti-strike 
program. This proposed an extension of TUC gênerai council powers to 
make binding awards in inter-union jurisdiction disputes and to intervene 
into strikes in breach of procédure to issue recommendations for their 
seulement. In the event of unjustifiable strikes the gênerai council could 
require the unions concerned to order a back-to-work and would expect 
them to undertake appropriate action, including fines, suspensions or 
expulsions, if such an order was rejected by their members. In addition, 
member unions who rejected thèse recommendations would be ultimately 
liable to suspension or expulsion from the TUC 19. This program was 
overwhelmingly approved by the conférence delegates who also passed a 
motion in opposition by the Government's proposais. By the end of June, 
1969, Prime Minister Wilson acknowledged defeat. The Government's anti-
strike proposais were withdrawn, in clear récognition of the absence of 
any support in the Cabinet or the Party for a fight to the finish with the 
unions on this issue. Thus, the Government had to settle for a « solemn 
undertaking » by the TUC that its new procédures would be applied 
vigorously 20. 
The Government went ahead with an industrial relations Bill, but, 
as agreed, it largely included proposais favorable only to the TUC, which 
resulted in substantial Conservative and CBI criticism. The BiH's most 
important provisions were the permanent establishment of the Commission 
on Industrial Relations - it had been set up earlier as a Royal Commission, 
the registration of agreements, union récognition procédures, the légal right 
of ail employées to join unions and the protection of workers against unf air 
dismissals. However, with the announcement of a General Election for 
18
 For a detailed review and analysis of Labour's White Paper see R.F. BANKS, 
op. cit., pp. 366-78. 
19
 See The Trades Union Congress, Programme for Action, London, June 1969, 
pp. 11-13. 
20 An « inside » view of the struggle is ably provided in Peter Jenkins', The 
Battle of Downing Street, Charles Knight and Co., Ltd., London, 1970. 
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June, 1970 and the subséquent dissolution of Parliament, the Bill did not 
become law. 
The Conservative victory in June, 1970 substantially changed the 
character of the debate over industrial relations reform. The new Govern-
ment designated a comprehensive industrial relations Act as a major 
législative priority and relentlessly pressed on to gain Common's approval 
of the Bill in March, 1971. This provoked bitter opposition from both the 
TUC and the Labour Party as the Tory's Bill, together with substantial 
price inflation, became a major cause of widespread industrial unrest during 
1970. The unions largely boycotted consultations with the Government on 
the Bill ; several officiai démonstrations and widely supported unofficial 
strikes were called in opposition to the program ; and a March 1971 
spécial conférence recommended that affiliated unions should be advised 
neither to register under the Act nor to sign legally binding collective 
agreements and to boycott the Act's new industrial relations machinery. 
The Labour Opposition's response was equally unyielding, culminating in 
a record 22 hours sitting in the House of Commons, involving 63 separate 
division votes, on the Bill's third reading. 
The new Industrial Relations Bill, with few exceptions, is based on 
the Conservative's earlier policy document, Fair Deal ai Work, published 
in April, 196821. The Bill strongly supports the développement of a 
voluntary industrial relations System, which, while promoting the freedom 
and security of individual workers, encourages collective bargaining bet-
ween responsible unions, firms and employers' associations. Moreover, it 
assumes that a comprehensive légal framework has a positive rôle to play 
in the improvement of industrial relations. The Government also promised 
a new code of industrial relations practice encouraging mature and res-
ponsible collective bargaining, which while not legally enforceable, could 
21
 This review is based on the Bill approved by the House of Commons. 
Additional amendments are being added in the House of Lords and the Bill is not 
expected to become law until July, 1971. The main différences were that the new 
proposais 1) set up a new National Industrial Relations Court rather than expanding 
the scope of the existing Industrial Court ; 2) established the Commission on In-
dustrial Relations on a permanent basis with expanded powers whereas Fair Deal 
at Work specified no rôle for such a body ; 3) did not provide for législative remédies 
to deal with restrictive work practices, while the earlier document planned a signi-
ficant rôle in this regard for the National Board for Priées and Incomes, which was 
abolished in the Autumn of 1970 ; and 4) did not remove the légal immunity of 
unions or strikers involved in démarcation disputes. 
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be used as a judgmental framework by the agencies established under the 
proposed Act. 
The Bill spécifies five statutory agencies to administer the new in-
dustrial relations law : a National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC), 
the Industrial Tribunals, the Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR), 
a Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations and an Arbit-
ration Board (the current Industrial Court with a new title). Of thèse, 
the only wholly new body is the NIRC which émerges as the High Court 
of an extensive judicial System for industrial relations matters. The NIRC 
is to be composed of both légal and lay members sitting in several div-
isions, with its jurisdiction, as well as that of the currently operative 
industrial tribunals - which are expanded into full-fledged labor courts 
by the Bill - including contract breaches connected with industrial dis-
putes, breaches of legally enforceable collective agreements, the breaking 
of contracts between unions or between unions and their members, in-
fringements of ail rights guaranteed by the législation and the perpétration 
of some 29 specified « unfair industrial actions, » 15 relating to unions 
and 14 to employers. The NIRC and the industrial tribunals guarantee 
full légal représentation for the affected parties within a framework of an 
informai procédure, which provides opportunities for the conciliation of 
disputes. Both bodies may award compensation to injured parties by fines 
of various amounts against unions, employées and individuals with the 
NIRC enabled to enforce its own décisions as well as those of the in-
dustrial tribunals. 
A major concern of the Bill is the rights of workers both as union 
members and employées. Workers are enabled to choose whether or not 
to join a union, with activities of unions or employers which deny thèse 
rights being designated as « unfair industrial actions. 22 » Ail employées, 
with limited exceptions, are also guaranteed the right of appeal to in-
dustrial tribunals concerning ail dismissals from work. If an unfair dis-
missal is proved, an industrial tribunal may order a worker reinstated or 
to be paid compensation, although extensive informai conciliation of such 
disputes is provided prior to formai adjudication. Finally, the Bill extends 
the period of notice guaranteed to long service employées, reduces the 
minimum qualifying period for such benefits and widens the range of in-
22
 In an amendment to the Bill the Conservatives tilted the balance in favor 
of union membership by allowing employers « to encourage a worker to join a union. » 
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formation to be supplied to employées about their contracts of employment 
by amendments to the Contracts of Employment Act of 1963. 
In particular, the législation outlaws « pre-entry closed shops where 
union membership is a prerequisite to employment, except for limited cases 
in which the NIRC finds them necessary for effective industrial relations. 
However, « agency shop » agreements are allowed, subject to approval by 
a majority of workers covered by the agreement in a ballot, requested 
either by 20 percent of such employées or the employer concerned. A 
« yes » vote requires an employer to implement the « agency shop, » whiie 
a « no » vote prevents the union from requesting such an agreement for 
a two year period. Under agency shop agreements employers would require 
ail relevant workers to join the union or pay a regular contribution in lieu 
of membership or be dismissed. Individuals, who because of conscientious 
grounds, objected to paying union dues could make an appropriate con-
tribution to charity. However, thèse non-members would not hâve a right 
to ail the benefits of union membership, and would not hâve a contract of 
membership with the union. 
Another major feature of the Bill places unions and employers asso-
ciations on the same basis in law as other organizations. However, such 
status would be granted only to those bodies which registered with the 
new Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations. Such re-
gistration would supply continued légal immunity from acts done in fur-
therance or contemplation of an industrial dispute, but not for other 
tortious acts, including « unfair industrial actions. » The Bill spécifies that 
organizations approved for registration must provide rules guaranteeing 
reasonable admission standards and membership rights and supply an 
extensive annual report of their accounts to the Registrar. 
Individuals with complaints against a trade union may appeal to the 
Registrar, who normally attempts to informally résolve such cases. Un-
resolved complaints would be heard by an industrial tribunal or the NIRC, 
which could award compensation to the injured party. Moreover, any 
union which persistently breached its members' rights could be deregistered. 
Finally, the Bill limits the term « trade union, » access to procédures for 
union récognition or the estabhshment of « agency shops » and the légal 
immunity in labor disputes only to those bodies which are duly registered. 
Moreover, unregistered combinations of workers would be liable for 
engaging in the Bill's specified « unfair industrial actions » as well as an 
additional « unfair industrial action » - the urging or persuasion of wor-
kers to break their contracts of employment during a labor dispute. 
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In a major way, the Bill supports voluntary collective bargaining. 
The Labour Administration's Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) 
is established on a permanent basis with one of its major functions being 
assistance to unions and employées in their voluntary reform of industrial 
relations through reports on individual cases referred to it by the Minister 
of Employment23. Firms are also required to notify the content of pro-
cédure agreements to the Department of Employment and under the pro-
posed new Code of Industrial Relations, employers must provide unions 
with information on their activities to assist in the effective conduct of 
negotiations. 
Equally important, procédures for union récognition are provided, 
enabling a registered trade union, an employer, employers' association or 
the Government to make a claim to the NIRC concerning récognition 
disputes. Such claims, if a voluntary seulement proved impossible, would 
be referred for investigation by the CIR, which could designate, where 
relevant, an appropriate bargaining unit or units, one bargaining agent for 
each unit and any conditions which should be satisfied before récognition 
can be granted to the bargaining agent. Subséquent to the completion of 
the CLR's report, the NIRC, on the application of the employer or the 
bargaining agent, could enforce its recommendations, subject to a majority 
endorsing vote by the employées concerned. Following such enforcement 
of the CIR report « unfair industrial actions » would be for an employer 
to fail to negotiate seriously, or to deal with any other union except the 
specified bargaining agent and for unions or workers to take or threaten 
industrial action to disrupt the statutory bargaining structure. If an em-
ployer failed to negotiate seriously, the NIRC could give the union a 
unilatéral right to refer a claim for improved wages and working conditions 
to the Arbitration Board whose award would be binding on the employer 
concerned. 
23
 Strangely enough, at the same time as the Labour established CIR was 
given a major rôle in the Conservative's industrial relations program, its future 
seems in doubt. Mr. George Woodcock, the ex-general secretary of the TUC and 
chairman of the CIR resigned after the new law's introduction, joining the two 
other trade union members who had previously left the Commission. Mr. Wood-
cock, who had opposed the new law as irrelevant to voluntary industrial relations 
reform, primarily based his résignation on the TUC's décision to boycott CIR pro-
ceedings. Thèse résignations, in addition to Mr. Allan Flanders' retirement as a 
resuit of ill-health, now leaves the CIR with only one permanent member. For a 
good statement of the CIR's cautious, case-by-case approach to industrial relations 
reform see, The Commission on Industrial Relations, First Annual Report, Cmnd. 
4417, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970, especially pp. 1-5. 
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Two of the Bill's most controversial measures concern the légal status 
of collective agreements and procédures for national emergency disputes. 
The Conservative Government strongly supports the desirability of re-
moving the ambiguity of the légal status of collective agreements, to express 
their terms in clear language and to encourage the parties to honor them 
as binding in law. Accordingjy, ail agreements entered in after the in-
troduction of the Act are presumed to be legally binding and enforceable 
unless the parties explicitly designate to the contrary. Moreover, in cases 
in which such agreements did not exist or where defective and poor in-
dustrial relations existed, the Secretary of Employment, at the request of 
the union or employer concerned, could ask the NIRC for an investigation 
by the CIR to détermine whether existing or improved procédural agree-
ments should be made legally binding. In the six months following the 
CIR's report, the parties concerned would hâve the right to request the 
NIRC that its recommendation be made legally binding for the firm or 
plant concerned 24. 
Finally, the Minister of Employment may apply to the NIRC for a 
legally enforceable restraining Order against a strike likely to resuit in 
a national emergency or in severe hardships to prevent industrial action 
for a 60 day « cooling off » period. In addition, in thèse cases, or in those 
in which the Minister had reasonable doubt about the degree of support 
for a strike among union members, a secret strike ballot also could be 
ordered by the NIRC to be conducted by the union or the CIR with its 
results being made public. Although following the ballot and the expiration 
of the restraining Order unions would be free to strike, substantial efforts 
would be made to achieve a seulement during the « cooling off » period. 
Stripping away the rhetoric used in the dispute over the Conservative's 
program, the new law clearly has very much in common with the re-
commendations of the Donovan Commission and the 1966-70 Labour 
Government. Its provisions extend voluntary collective bargaining by re-
quiring that employers recognize and negotiate with unions and through 
its support of « agency shop » agreements ; it explicitly encourages the 
émergence of a System of plant and company bargaining ; it safeguards 
employées against unfair dismissals ; and with the establishment of the 
24
 The Confédération of British Industry had requested the possible intro-
duction of legally binding agreements across a whole industry under this procédure. 
However, the Conservatives refused this request, wishing to enable an individual 
employer to apply for legally binding agreements in relevant cases. 
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new Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, it seeks to 
prevent membership rights from being subverted by their organizations. 
Its fundamental différence is the emphasis on the law as a change 
agent for reform, especially through the introduction of legally binding 
agreement with the agreement of both parties, together with the possible 
unilatéral establishment of such arrangements in cases in which industrial 
relations had deteriorated seriously. While this feature is important, its 
différence from the previous Labour Administration's proposais is largely 
one of degree. Indeed, Harold Wilson's opposition to the new législation 
was considered suspect by many trade union leaders as a resuit of his 
earlier support for « conciliation pauses > and « strike ballots. » Moreover, 
the debate within the TUC over opposition to the Act revealed sharp 
différences among its affiliâtes, especially the white collar unions, who had 
much to gain from the législation, and those unions, particularly the well 
entrenched engineers and transport workers, who were most threatened 
by the law. 
Already dire prédictions hâve been made about the likely consé-
quences of the new législation, particularly because of its libéral borrowing 
from American labor relations law25. Victor Feather, the TUC's gênerai 
secretary, has denounced it as « unnecessary, irrelevant and unworkable » 
and other critics hâve conjured up spectres either of a widespread dis-
regard for the law or of extensive litigation of industrial relations issues. 
Surely it is too early to make any such judgments, but major factors in-
fluencing the immédiate impact of the Act are a quick healing of the 
partisan break provoked by its introduction and more importantly, the 
TUC's willingness to reconsider its boycott of the new law. In any event, 
as the Tories themselves hâve argued, any fundamental reform of British 
industrial relations must corne from the voluntary efforts of unions and 
management. The Conservatives hope the new Act ultimately will en-
courage effective responses to this challenge, while at the same time 
bringing the légal framework of British industrial relations closer in Une 
with the industrial relations Systems in the advanced industrial countries 
of Western Europe and North America. 
25
 Recently J.W. Garbarino has pointed to the possibility of a growing con-
vergence of British and American labor relations practices, while cautioning against 
too high expectations regarding the Conservative's extensive importation of American 
procédures. See J.W. GARBARINO, « British and American Labor Market Trends : 
A Case of Convergence ? » The Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XVII, 
No. 2, June, 1970, pp. 319-336. 
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Innovations in Collective Bargaining 
In the 1960's there also hâve been important innovations in collective 
bargaining by both sides of industry, including the development of long-
term agreements, the émergence of productivity bargaining and the ne-
gotiation of agreements which narrow or remove the traditional différences 
in pay and status between manual and non-manual workers. 
Since 1960 there has been a shift away from the usual open-ended 
collective agreement to those providing for annual improvements. in pay 
and working conditions over a stipulated period of time. By 1967, several 
key industries had negotiated two or three-year agreements, and in ail, 
more than eight million workers or approximately one-third of the total 
labor force was covered by long-term pacts 26. 
A variety of factors led both sides of industry to negotiate long term 
agreements. Their appeal to management, apart from gênerai économie and 
stratégie considérations, was a resuit of union pressure for the 40-hour 
week which led many employers to view thèse agreements as a means of 
absorbing the costs of shorter hours on a phased basis. In addition, the three 
year agreements first negociated in 1965 in the important engineering and 
shipbuilding industries also allowed management to raise the wages of 
lower-paid workers modestly without immédiate pressure to restore tra-
ditional pay differentials. For the unions, long-term agreements provided 
periodic wage increases for their members without requiring annual ne-
gotiations and shorter hours and improved fringe benefits could be achieved 
more easily on a phased basis. Moreover, certain national trade union 
officiais argued that they would hâve more time to service their members 
if they were freed from the burden of annual negotiations. 
Whether long-term agreements will become a permanent feature of 
the British collective bargaining System probably will be determined by 
union attitudes ; for generally they hâve more immédiate advantages to 
management, although some employers critieized the effects of continued 
local bargaining during the life of thèse pacts. Currently, such union 
attitudes are unpredictable. Many union memberships hâve critieized 
long-term agreements, in view of the fact that the wage improvements 
obtained hâve lagged behind inflationary trends. Moreover, union oppo-
26 See R.F. BANKS, « Long Term Agreements and Package Deals, » lndustrial 
Welfare, October, 1965, pp. 244-49. 
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sition was encouraged by the Government's wage freeze in 1966, which 
deferred wage improvements provided under many long-term agreements 
and subsequently allowed only a narrow scope for pay increases under 
its stringent incomes policy. 
In the late 1960's some industries did negotiate or renew long-term 
agreements ; but other key groups, such as the postmen, non-manual civil 
servants and the railwaymen, shifted back to one-year agreements and, 
in the important building industry, in which two successive long-term 
agreements had been agreed, a one-year pact was introduced in 1968, 
although a two-year agreement was negotiated again in 1969. Nevertheless, 
the long-term agreement cannot yet be dismissed as a temporary aberration 
of the British collective bargaining scène. Late in 1968 the key engineering 
and shipbuilding industries renewed their three-year agreements and some 
observers argue that the trend toward formai local agreements may en-
courage fixed-term, although not necessarily phased, settlements 27. Thus, 
while undoubtedly union interest in long-term agreements has cooled, it 
may blossom again for they still command support in important sections 
of British industry. 
New agreements which narrow or remove pay and/or status distinc-
tions between manual and white collar workers are another innovation. 
In Britain, as in most industrial countries, such distinctions hâve existed 
between « staff» and manual workers, but since 1945, they hâve been 
sharply reduced as a resuit of bargaining gains made by the manual 
workers or technicians, although they usually hâve to work longer hours 
to achieve this financially superior position. In récent years some British 
managements hâve argued that such distinctions between staff and manual 
employées are both socially unjustifiable and economically inappropriate 
under modem technology 28. 
In the 1960's several agreements introduced staff status for manual 
workers and other firms are considering similar innovations, although the 
traditional distinctions between manual and staff employées is by no 
means close to being eliminated generally in British industry. For example, 
the Electricity Council placed its industrial employées on annual salaries 
worker's unions. Today many manual employées earn more than office 
and introduced a sick pay scheme similar to the one which covered their 
27 ROBERTS and GENNARD, op. cit., at pp. 160-161 argue that this might be so. 
28 The Industrial Society, Status and Benefits in Industry, London, 1966, p. 30. 
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salaried staff. Under a similar agreement negotiated with the Impérial 
Chemicals Industries, Ltd., manual workers were granted annual salaries, 
improved sickness pay and greater employment security. Other agreements 
covering the ESSO Petroleum Company and the nationalized airlines 
hâve also reduced the white collar/manual workers' status differential. 
Finally, the Priées and Incomes Board urged the Government to pioneer 
in the introduction of staff status for its employées 29. 
In the future, progressive British managements are likely to stress 
the importance of flexible work rules and practices to meet the require-
ments of modem production technologies. And, in this context, staff 
status for ail employées may be introduoed as a step toward making the 
enterprise a more homogeneous social unit, particularly as many manual 
workers are now becoming more highly skilled and responsible for 
expensive capital equipment. Thus, the graduai extension of staff status 
for industrial workers in Britain is Mkely to continue irrespective of any 
future growth in social security benefits, the opposition of staff employées, 
and the continued need for differentiated pay structures. 
Productivity bargaining is clearly the most significant of thèse 
innovations in British collective bargaining. Its purpose and approach 
can be clearly distinguished from conventional collective negotiations in 
which the parties are conoerned exclusively with a division of the available 
resources in the firm or the industry, while productivity bargaining 
emphasizes joint union-management coopération in agreeing to change 
work practices to increase the amount of resources available to be shared 
between them. 
Early in the décade the management of Britain's most progressive 
firms and industries was its main initiator, although many unions embraced 
productivity bargaining as a means of achieving higher pay, improved 
status and increased fringe benefits for their members. Since 1966, 
Government policy played a larger rôle as productivity improvements were 
continuously re-emphasized as the most relevant criterion for justifying 
« exceptional » wage increases under the incomes policy and many Priées 
and Incomes Board reports singled out productivity bargaining as an 
important method to achieve improved industrial efficiency. Nevertheless, 
productivity bargains are still confined to a small portion of British 
industry. An extensive survey in 1966 revealed that no more than 750.000 
29 See National Board for Priées and Incomes Report No. 18, Pay of Industrial 
Civil Servants, Cmnd. 3034, H.M.S.O., London, 1966. 
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employées were covered by productivity agreements30. Undoubtedly, the 
number of workers covered has increased since then, but probably only 
a small percentage of the working population are covered by genuine 
productivity bargaining31. 
Productivity bargaining has undoubtedly made a significant contri-
bution to industrial efficiency, but its reconciliation with industry-wide 
bargaining has been difficult32. This is because the bargainable issues 
in most productivity agreements are unique to the company or plant 
concerned and negotiations on them must be conducted by local 
management and union représentatives. So far, industry-wide productivity 
agreements — mainly negotiated in the nationalized industries which 
operate under centralized management control — hâve been rare, but 
their expérience has demonstrated that extensive and detailed local 
negotiations are necessary for their successful implementation. 
The advantages to management of plant level productivity bargaining 
are the ability to identify spécifie obstacles to efficiency, to concentrate 
on gaining the acceptance of changes from particular work groups and 
to directly monitor the implementation of the negotiated changes in work 
rules and practices. An obvious union benefit is the opportunity for 
covered workers to win substantial wage improvements. Altematively, 
under industrywide agreements it has been difficult to single out inefficient 
opérations which are common to the whole industry and to ensure a direct 
link between pay improvements and compensatory changes in work 
practices, while differential wage gains which benefit only some of their 
members hâve caused internai political problems for some unions. The 
successful expérience of both industrywide and companywide productivity 
30 Ken JONES and John GOLDING, Productivity Bargaining, Fabian Research 
Séries, No. 257, London, 1966, p. 5. 
31
 For 1968 and 1969 the Department of Employment and Productivity re-
ported that some 3,000 settlements covering six million workers had been included 
in its register of submissions under the « productivity » clause of the incomes policy. 
However, as Professor Turner suggests, most of thèse agreements did not include 
any extraordinary changes in working methods or practices. See H.A. TURNER, 
op. cit., pp. 202-203. 
32
 For detailed information on the content of productivity agreements see : 
JONES and GOLDING, op. cit., chapter two and Royal Commission on Trade Unions 
and Employers' Associations, Research Paper 4 : 1 Productivity Bargaining ; 2 Res-
trictive Labour Practices, London, H.M.S.O., 1967. Also Allan FLANDERS, The 
Fawley Productivity Agreements : A Case Study of Management and Collective 
Bargaining, London, Faber and Faber, 1964. 
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agreements demonstrates that this bargaining approach can be success-
fully applied outside a spécifie plant context. But, they hâve been difficult 
to negotiate and administer and hâve placed severe strains on both the 
unions and management involved. 
The development of productivity bargaining on a completely de-
centralized basis does raise a number of problems. For example, the 
substantial improvements granted under thèse agreements may resuit 
in union pressure on other firms in the same labor market to match thèse 
concessions on a basis unrelated to productivity33. More importantly, its 
growth, and that of plant bargaining generally, may force changes in the 
traditional rôle of both the national unions and employers' associations 
in the bargaining process. Thus, they are likely to become involved 
increasingly in national negotiations which are formally recognized as 
covering only minimum standards, with their new major functions being 
that of servicing, supporting and supervising local bargaining activities. 
Although some of the larger unions and employers' associations hâve 
begun to face up to the possibility of thèse changes in their bargaining 
functions, changes are likely to be slow 34. This will be particularly true 
of the employers' associations whose numerous small and medium-sized 
members still look to them, quite properly, as a défense against gênerai 
union demands, rather than as a consultant to their own independent 
bargaining initiatives 35. 
Thèse important innovations demonstrate the vitality of the bargaining 
process and show that British employers and unions can, if they choose, 
face up to the challenges of the 1970's. However, so far their growth 
has been limited with the major bottlenecks to any significant extension 
being both the limited capacity and détermination of many British 
33 For a fuller élaboration of this and other criticisms, see the Confédération 
of British Industry, Evidence to the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers1 Associations, 1965, paragraphs 83, 91-2, 112-115; also W.R. KEELER, 
« The Relationship of Plant Productivity Agreements to Incomes Policy, » The 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. V, No. 1, March 1967, pp. 40-47. 
34 Information on some of thèse changes, both philosophie and procédural, 
can be found in : E. McCullough, « Productivity Agreements and the Structure of 
Collective Bargaining, » The British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. V, No. 1, 
March 1967 ; Martin Jukes, The Rôle of the Industrial Fédération in the 1970's, 
Industrial Education and Research Foundation, London, 1968 ; and The Engineering 
Employers' Fédération, Productivity Bargaining and the Engineering Industry, Lon-
don, 1968. 
35 This view is strongly emphasized in the Royal Commission on Trade Unions 
and Employers' Associations Research Paper 7, Employers' Associations, H.M.S.O., 
London, 1968. 
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managements to make the necessary changes and the unwillingness of 
many unions to drop their défensive positions and cooperate in joint 
efforts to improve industrial efficiency. Clearly, Government policy and 
labor cost pressures in the future will encourage thèse developments, 
especially that of productivity bargaining, but the extensiveness or rapidity 
of their gênerai introduction into British industry is questionable. 
The Challenge of Incomes Policy 
So far this article has been concerned with collective bargaining 
at the industry or plant level. However, since 1945, Britain's traditional 
collective bargaining System has been modified by the efforts of ail 
governments to devise effective incomes policies. The impetus for British 
incomes policy emerged out of a govemmental commitment to a set of 
policy goals, which hâve been difficult to achieve simultaneously, together 
with the fact that traditional demand restraint policies hâve worked 
clumsily and become unacceptable as solutions to Britain's économie 
problems when pushed beyond a certain point. Like other Western 
industrial économies, Britain is committed to three gênerai policy goals : 
rapid économie growth, full employment and stable priées. But, their 
achievement was made even more difficult by the addition of another 
major goal to this triumvirate — the stability of the Pound. Supporting 
a world currency requires a strong foreign trade position — a difficult 
task to achieve in a country whose imports are approximately 20 percent 
of its national income. Moreover, this problem is compounded further 
because the British economy has experienced a relatively slow growth 
of productivity, resulting in her export priées rising faster than those 
of her competitors — a major reason why Britain's share of world trade 
has fallen sharply since the end of the war. 
A full-blown history of incomes policy in postwar Britain is impossible 
to provide hère 36. However, its « modem » epoch dates from the early 
36 There is now a voluminous literature on British incomes policy. Two useful 
gênerai sources are : D.C. SMITH, Incomes Policies : Some Foreign Expérience and 
Their Relevance for Canada, Ottawa, Economie Council of Canada, October 1966 ; 
and E.H. Phelps BROWN, « Guidelines for Growth and for Incomes in the United 
Kingdom : Some Possible Lessons for the United States, » in G.P. Schultz and R.Z. 
Aliber (Eds.), Guidelines, Informai Controls and the Market Place, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1966. A detailed and particularly perceptive review 
of the British expérience prior to the November 1967 dévaluation can be found 
in Lloyd Ulman, « Under Severe Restraint : British Incomes Policy, » Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, May 1967, pp. 213-66. 
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1960's with the most récent phase in British expérience with incomes 
policy commencing with the élection of a Labour Government in 1964. 
Indeed, the new Government stressed that a voluntary incomes policy 
would be a key component of its gênerai économie program. And, this 
strategy reflected the Wilson Administration's confidence in winning 
the unions' support, which was encouraged by several distinctive features 
of Labour's incomes policy. 
In the first place, of course, union support was fortheoming on 
ideological grounds, but this basis for coopération was strengthened by 
the Govemment's willingness to introduce a policy which provided equal 
treatment for priées, dividends and wages. This commitment was de-
monstrated by the abolition of the Conservative's National Incomes 
Commission and its replacement with a new review body — the National 
Board for Priées and Incomes. Secondly, the Wilson Administration 
rejected wage restraint, and instead espoused a positive policy for the 
« planned growth » of incomes in a context of économie planning in which 
the TUC would play an important rôle. Finally, the Government stressed 
that the incomes policy would be an instrument of social justice to improve 
the économie circumstances of low income groups in British society. 
However, what began as a glorious effort to establish a compre-
hensive productivity, priées and incomes policy soon turned into a 
disaster. From the start inflation and balance of payments déficits, 
combined with heavy pressures on Sterling, thwarted the Govemment's 
efforts and subsequently forced the introduction of a severe program of 
traditional deflationary measures, including a wage/price freeze and 
finally, in November 1967, a dévaluation of the Pound. As a resuit, the 
Wilson Administration's long-term growth and social equity objectives 
had to be sacrificed to the exigencies of économie crisis and thèse policies, 
plus a ster>by-step introduction of législation to delay or prevent wage 
or price increases led to bitter disagreements between the Government, 
the TUC and the CBI, squabbles within the Labour Party and a dissipation 
of the political support Labour had achieved in the 1966 gênerai élection. 
By the Fall of 1969 the policy had lost its credibility and following a 
substantial explosion of wage increases in the subséquent nine months, 
it was clearly a dead letter when the Conservatives returned to power 
in June, 197037. 
37
 A stage-by-stage development of Labour's incomes policy, usually marked 
by the publication of government policy in various White Papers is found in, « Chro-
nicle : Industrial Relations in the United Kingdom, » published as an appendix to 
each issue of The British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
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In spite of this gloomy record, an évaluation of Labour's incomes 
policy does provide important lessons for the future. However., before 
proceeding with such a review, an examination of the key rôle played 
by the National Board for Priées and Incomes in the administrative 
évolution of the policy is worth considération. The National Board for 
Priées and Incomes was established in February 1965 as a statutory, 
tripartite review agency to examine individual références in order to 
advise whether or not the behavior of priées, wages, salaries or other 
money incomes was in the national interest38. Since 1966, with the émer-
gence of Labour's increasingly stringent incomes policy, the rôle of the 
Board expanded both as a resuit of a larger workload and an extension 
of its powers. Between April, 1965 and December, 1970, the Board pu-
blished 164 reports with the bulk of them focusing on industrywide wage-
price décisions, roughly divided between cases in the public and private 
sectors. 
The Board's unique contribution was largely a resuit of its own 
définition of its rôle in the incomes policy. As the Board observed in its 
first report in June 1965 39 : 
« There are two possible causes lying behind the phenomenon of rislng 
priées. First, demand may be too high in relation to the capacity to 
meet it. Secondly, even though demand may be reasonably in line with 
capacity, old habits, inherited attitudes and institutional arrangements 
may nonetheless ail still combine to exert an upward pressure on priées. 
The treatment of the first cause . . . lies with the Government. It is the 
treatment of the second cause only ; i.e., old habits, inherited attitudes 
and institutional arrangements, which lies with ourselves as a Board. 
Success in dealing with each of the two causes, however, dépends on 
success in dealing with the other. 
. . . (Nevertheless), expérience has shown that attitudes are not changed 
by a use of the fiscal and monetary weapons at the disposai of the 
Government. Nor are they susceptible to législation - habits are not 
changed by law. We see ourselves as promoting change by conducting 
a continuing dialogue with management, unions and indeed Govern-
ment ». 
38
 For a review of the Board's early expérience see, Robert B. MCKERSIE, « The 
British Board for Priées and Incomes, » Industrial Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, May 
1967, pp. 267-84. 
39
 The National Board for Priées and Incomes, Road Haulage Rates, Report 
No. 1 (Intérim) Cmnd. 2695, London, H.M.S.O., June 1965, p. 1. 
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Essentially the Board saw itself engaged in a long-term campaign to 
change union-management attitudes and practices which impeded industrial 
efficiency. However, the Board also performed a judicial function, involv-
ing judgment on particular wage-price décisions using the policy's gênerai 
criteria. But even in this rôle it acted cautiously, not wishing to reject 
flatly a proposed price or pay increase. Thus, usually it recommended im-
provements in industrial efficiency to reduce the need for price increases 
or to bring wage costs closer to what was acceptable under the incomes 
policy. 
This policy of diplomacy was reflected in the Board's operating pro-
cédures. Its légal powers requiring the submission of évidence were never 
used because this approach might hâve encouraged compliance without 
achieving the coopération of the parties in improving industrial efficiency. 
Moreover, while its décisions were not legally enforceable, the Board 
widely publicized its recommendations and, more importantly, devised 
procédures to monitor their implementation. In some cases the Board sub-
mitted intérim reports so that the situation could be reviewed before a 
final report was issued. In others, the parties were required to report back 
to the Board or make public progress reports. Finally, a number of indus-
tries were the subject of several références to the Board, providing oppor-
tunités for an évaluation of the progress made since the last report. 
Nevertheless, Britain's économie difficulties forced the Board to strike 
a perilous balance between this problem-solving rôle and the need to 
confront wage-price décisions against the immédiate background of an 
increasingly stringent incomes policy. The Board's reconciliation of thèse 
competing objectives is demonstrated best in a review of its principles for 
wage-price behavior. 
In its application of the price criteria under the policy, the Board 
opposed price increases, except in those cases where uncontrollable costs 
had risen, while strongly emphazing that compensatory réductions should 
be made in costs under management's direct control. Since 1967 the effects 
of increased taxation or the dévaluation were the only generally acceptable 
justifications for price rises, but ail such références were scrutinized care-
fully to détermine their justification. 
In the field of wage review, the Board had more opportunities for 
innovation as it differentially applied ail four of the above-the-norm wage 
exceptions which were listed in the April, 1965 White Paper as being 
confined to the following circumstances : 
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Where the employées concemed make a direct contribution towards 
increasing productivity (for example by accepting more exacting work 
or a major change in working practices) ; where it is essential to secure 
a change in the distribution of manpower ; where existing wage and 
salary levels are too low to maintain a reasonable standard of living ; 
and where pay for certain workers has fallen seriously out of line with 
the level of rémunération for similar work. 
The Board opposed the application of the labor shortage and com-
parability criteria on the grounds that their acceptance would resuit in 
inflationary labor cost increases. It took a particularly tough stand on the 
wages comparability in spite of the fact that this concept is a deepnrooted 
premise of British collective bargaining. Chairman Aubrey Jones justified 
this approach on the grounds that40 : 
« There is much évidence that comparisons are in fact extensively used 
when they serve neither as as measure of the market nor as a measure 
or fairness... When comparison is pushed beyond its due purpose In 
this way it can cause concessions legitimately made in exchange for 
changes in working practices to be copied without any corresponding 
change in working practices and, therefore, with inflationary con-
séquences. For this reason the Board has sought to abate the exagger-
ated use of comparisons ». 
However, the Board was aware that this criteria could not be totally 
abandoned. Thus, it argued that comparisons should be made only between 
groups with similar skills and qualifications and in common labor markets 
rather than between groups whose pay levels had been linked simply 
through tradition, custom and past practice. 
The low pay and productivity criteria were emphasized strongly by 
the Board since the introduction of Labour's stringent incomes policy in 
1966, with the need for increased productivity being a major thème in 
many of its reports. Moreover, since the autumn of 1966 the Government 
resurrected low pay (along with increased productivity) as one of the 
two justifications for exceptional pay increases and dispatched several réfé-
rences to the Board on claims for increased minimum wages. 
In thèse reports the Board argued that the lower paid should hâve a 
prior claim on resources for wage increases, while stressing that the wage 
System was an imperfect instrument to improve their circumstances, which 
could be best provided by extended social services. Moreover, as its me-
4 0
 Quoted in MCKERSIE, op. cit., p. 275. 
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thod of determining who were among the lowest paid, the Board rejected 
any gênerai « standard of need » in favor of detailed comparative examin-
ations of wage rates, earnings, hours worked and other fringe benefits. It 
also argued that when the lowest pay levels were improved, those differ-
entials which should be maintained should be distinguished from those 
which should not. Finally, several reports criticized the wages councils for 
neglecting the plight of the lower paid and being contributors to infla-
tionary wage pressures 41. 
The Board's tough-minded, although admittedly preliminary, review 
of the problem of the lower paid was an important input in policy dis-
cussions. A Labour Government study carefully reviewed the problems 
of the implementation of a national minimum wage and in 1970 législation 
providing equal pay for women workers by 1975 was introduced. More 
specifically, partly in response to Board criticism, the Department of 
Employment reviewed the wages council System to détermine its capacity 
to encourage voluntary collective bargaining and to provide a context 
for a closer linking of pay and productivity. 
The productivity criterion has been the most strongly endorsed by 
the Board and has been applied extensively in many of its reports. For, as 
it observed in its first annual report : « We hâve endeavored in reply to 
each of the références made to us — whether it be a référence relating to 
incomes or to priées — to put forward concrète suggestions for increased 
productivity. We hâve done this because the only source for increase 
incomes which will not lead to increases in priées is improved producti-
vity » 42. In 1966 the encouragement of genuine productivity bargains 
became the centerpiece of Labour's incomes policy, and by 1969 the Go-
vernment had requested the Board on three occasions to develop guide-
lines to evaluate productivity agreements. After lengthy study in August, 
1969, the Board outlined in détail the spécifie features of acceptable pro-
ductivity agreements 43. In addition to this gênerai évaluation, the Board 
41
 For a detailed discussion of thèse reports and the response to them see, R.F. 
BANKS, « Wages Councils and Incomes Policy, » The British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. V, No. 3, November 1967, pp. 338-358. Also, The National Board 
for Priées and Incomes, Pay and Conditions in the Clothing Manufacturing Indus-
tries, Report No. 110, Cmnd. 4002, London, H.M.S.O., April 1969. 
42
 The National Board for Priées and Incomes, General Report : April 1965 
to July 1966, Cmnd. 3087, London, H.M.S.O., August 1966, p. 11. 
43
 The National Board for Priées and Incomes, Productivity Agreements, Cmnd. 
4136, London, H.M.S.O., August 1969. 
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also examined particular productivity pacts, although several of its recom-
mendations were less stringent than its gênerai guidelines 44. Nevertheless, 
the Board's view was normally a judicious mixture of toughness and flexi-
bility, in line with its policy of providing immédiate solutions to bairgaining 
demands while also encouraging increased productivity in the longer 
term. 
In retrospect, it is difficult to evaluate the Board's spécifie contri-
bution to Labour's priées and incomes policy. Nevertheless, the Board 
generally was successful with regard to three spécifie considérations : first, 
its continued acceptance by management, unions and by implication, the 
public at least until the late 1960's ; secondly, its recommendations of 
spécifie changes in wage-price behavior acceptable to the parties ; and 
thirdly, its critical évaluation of some key practices of British collective 
bargaining. 
The Board's acceptability was a resuit of a variety of reasons. In the 
first place, it administered a policy which focused equally on priées and 
incomes. Moreover, the able leadership of chairman, Mr. Aubrey Jones, 
produced an extraordinary mixture of toughness, shrewdness and ima-
gination in its reports. In addition, the Board usually reported quickly, 
usually within three to four months of receiving a référence, so thaï; it often 
influenced the parties' attitudes before final décisions were made. Further-
more, its use of informai investigating procédures encouraged a flexible 
non-adversary approach by the parties. Finally, the Board retained its 
independence of the Government both by its refusai to be transformed 
into simply another arbitration body and a vigorous statement of its own 
views on how the incomes policy ought to be applied in particular cases. 
Thus, until the death of Labour's incomes policy at the end of the décade, 
the Board's rôle was accepted with failures to cooperate in its investigation 
limited to a few cases. 
44 For example, in a récent report on the electricity supply industry - a pioneer 
in productivity bargaining - the Board justified a more libéral wage recommendation 
by arguing that « we hâve thought it équitable to make some spécial allowance for 
the fact that the coopération given under the Productivity and Status Agreement 
of 1964-65 was followed by a drop in earnings in the electricity supply industry in 
relation to earnings in industry generally. It cannot be regarded as a good adver-
tisement for a closer relationship between pay and performance if those who hâve 
been among the first to cooperate in such a relationship are seen to be falling behind 
others in their earnings. » See National Board for Priées and Incomes, Electricity 
Supply Workers, Report No. 42, Cmnd. 3405, H.M.S.O., London, September 1968, 
p. 22. 
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The Board also had immédiate impact on particular wage-price 
décisions, including the deferment of certain proposed increases, while 
other of its recommendations encouraged long-run institutional changes 45. 
The Board was not completely successful, however. Many recommendations 
simply were ignored or the parties failed to increase productivity to offset 
higher costs. It also experienced various operating problems. The Board 
could not sélect its own références, and, thus, it was unable to sélect key 
cases to elaborate the incomes policy criteria. Therefore, while the Board 
did specify its préférences for particular références in its annual reports, 
in the late 1960's it was particularly critical of the Government's référence 
strategy. 
Other problems were the limited time in which the Board was normally 
obligated to complète its studies and the absence of adéquate cost, wage 
and labor force data in several of its références. Finally, in some cases its 
application of the incomes policy criteria has been questionable. For 
example, its almost blanket support for the productivity criteria posed a 
number of practical and conceptual problems. And, the Board's gênerai 
opposition to the labor shortage and comparability criteria was somewhat 
overstated, although a broad acceptance of thèse principles would hâve 
encouraged a flood of wage claims 46. 
Undoubtedly, the Board's most important contribution was its évalu-
ation of some key practices of British collective bargaining. The Board's 
views on wage comparability specified the spécifie circumstances in which 
this criterion should be applied and its study of incentive payment Systems 
was one of the most detailed reviews ever undertaken of this aspect of 
British industrial relations. Its reports on lower paid workers identified 
the problems involved in determining who thèse workers were and the 
conséquences of increases for the lower paid on the structure of wage 
differentials. The Board's interprétation of the productivity exception pro-
vided spécifie guidance on how pay should be related to performance in 
concrète situations with thèse efforts contributing importantly to the dra-
matic growth of productivity bargaining in British industry. Finally, it 
45 Data on the outeome of the Board's spécifie recommendations can be found 
in its annual reports published in July or August since 1966. 
46 See MCKERSIE, op. cit., pp. 271-75; also, A.WJ. THOMSON, «Collective 
Bargaining Under Incomes Législation : The Case of Britain's Buses, » The Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 24, No. 3, April, 1971, pp. 389-406. 
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encouraged a decentralized, comprehensive system of plant bargaining, a 
development supported by the Royal Commission and by both the Labour 
and Conservative Governments 47. 
In summary, in spite of extensive difficulties, the Board did inject 
public interest considérations into Britain's voluntary collective bargaining 
system and demonstrated its ability as an effective « halfway » house 
between mère exhortation and a direct system of wage-price controls. In 
1970 the Labour Administration proposed its merger with the Monopolies 
Commission to form a Commission for Industry and Manpower with 
responsibilities for studying références concerning monopoly practices, 
company mergers, manpower and resource utilization and speoific wage-
price décisions. However, the Tory Opposition opposed this move and 
the new Conservative Government decided to abolish the NBPI after the 
completion of its remaining studies. Many of the Board's personnel are to 
be transferred to a new Commission for Compétition — the Toiy's pro-
posed replacement for the Monopolies Commission — while others will 
staff a new Office of Manpower Economies (OME) which is to service 
three standing review bodies concerned with the salaries of chairmen and 
board members of the nationalized industries, the Judiciary, senior civil 
servants and army officers ; the pay of the armed services generally ; and 
the rémunération of doctors and dentists. Reportedly the Conservatives' 
décision to abolish the NBPI was based on their opposition to a statutory 
priées and incomes policy and their conoern about growing state inter-
vention in the economy. Apparently the abandonment of any price review 
functions and the unpredictability of the new OME's rôle represents a 
Tory décision to dissipate the NBPI's expertise in the field of wage-price 
review because of doctrinal social and économie policy prédilections. 
What, then, are some of the gênerai lessons of the Labour Adminis-
tration's expérience with incomes policy ? First, the assignment of multiple 
goals to the policy such as stable priées, an improved balance of payments, 
higher rates of économie growth and income ré-distribution placed the 
Labour Government in a difficult position concerning trade-offs between 
them. In particular, as a resuit of Britain's disastrous économie circum-
stances both the économie growth and social equity goals were jettisoned 
47 See H.A. CLEGG, « The Rôle of Government Agencies, » The Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy. Vol. XVII, No. 2, June 1970, pp. 306-310. 
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in favor of inflation restraint policies, a program resulting in severe po-
litical handicaps for the Labour Government48. 
Secondly, the Wilson Administration^ sélection of an incomes policy 
as the major centerpiece of its domestic économie program proved un-
tenable. Thus, until its abolition in 1966, the voluntary incomes policy 
could not restrain the inflationary pressures generated by high levels of 
private demand, an expansion in public spending and the extensive sup-
plementation of national agreements by local wage drift. The wage-price 
freeze of 1966, together with the subséquent dévaluation and return to 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, reflects Labour's painful réco-
gnition that an incomes policy was simply a complément — and possibly 
a minimal one at that — to the traditional panoply of anti-inflation 
controls. 
Evidence on the effectiveness of compulsory wage-price controls is 
also available for between 1965 and 1969 Britain experimented with a 
variety of increasingly stringent restraints. Hère again the expérience is 
largely discouraging for, while such controls were indeed effective, 
particularly in the wage-price freeze of 1966, their long-run impact was 
negligible. This is because their effectiveness depended on an assumption 
that most unions and management will follow the incomes policy voluntarily 
with only a few « rogue éléphants » needing to be curbed by légal res-
traints. However, in a context of bouyant demand this basic assumption 
was disproved, and, as the Labour Govemment's pre-election behavior 
demonstrated, a vigorous application of such controls was politically 
dangerous. 
Alternatively, Britain's expérience shows that an incomes policy was 
a modestly important complément to other économie policies. History 
indicates that vigorously pursued on their own, traditional deflationary 
measures extract too high a price in terms of foregone économie growth 
and politically unacceptable levels of unemployment. Alternatively, a 
maximum growth policy based on the hope that productivity gains will 
outstrip inflationary pressures is a doubtful gamble. Thus, incomes policy 
appears to hâve achieved greater price stability at a cost of lower un-
48 An excellent gênerai discussion of Western European incomes policy and 
the source of many conclusions reached hère is Lloyd Ulman, « Wage-Price Policies : 
Some Lessons From Abroad, » Industrial Relations, Vol. 8, No. 3, May 1969, 
pp. 195-213. 
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employment than would hâve been the case otherwise, while also provid-
ing opportunities for modest additions to the rate of économie growth and 
some gains in social equity. A gênerai conclusion is that an incomes policy 
can complément effectively other économie policies, but its advantages 
are likely to be minimal and possibly transitory as the policy's political 
costs increase with a vigorous application in an inflationary context. 
Beyond thèse gênerai statements, some judgments are possible about 
the quantitative impact of Labour's incomes policy from the standpoint 
of both benefits and costs. Wage and price behavior has varied against a 
background of low unemployment and within broad limits both phenomena 
hâve been sensitive to changes in the level as well as rate of unemploy-
ment. On the wages side, according to a provisional NBPI study, the 
policy appears to hâve reduced the annual rate of wage rise by one percent 
from what it otherwise would hâve been. However, more detailed econo-
metric studies indicate a smaller positive impact, while still demonstrating 
that the policy did restrain wage rises49. On the priées side, its impact 
appears to hâve been considerably less, with the annual rate of price rise 
with the incomes policy being about the same as could be expected in its 
absence in a similar économie context. However, priées did increase at a 
lower rate in the freeze period of 1966-67 than would hâve been expected 
typically. 
British expérience also shows an almost non-existent re-distributive 
impact of the incomes policy as far as inter - and intra-industry wage 
differentials are concerned. The efforts to use the policy as an instrument 
to improve the position of lower paid workers foundered largely because 
their wage improvements usually were extended to ail workers in the 
industries concerned. In addition, opportunities for wage drift in the 
private sector allowed well-organized groups to re-assert customary wage 
relativities in local negotiations supplementing industrywide agreements. 
Several costs of the incomes policy also can be identified. A success-
ful application of the policy might hâve introduced rigidities in the allo-
49
 A widely quoted study of British incomes policy argued that its most suc-
cessful opération occurs at high levels of demand with the acceptance of some 
inflationary price rises. Alternatively, the gênerai acceptance of the policy's « wages 
norm » as a minimum standard for ail increases resulted in more substantial wage 
inflation than would be expected at higher levels of unemployment. See R.G. LIPSEY 
and J.M. PARKIN, « Incomes Policy : A Re-appraisal, » Economica, Vol. 37., No. 146, 
May, 1970, pp. 115-138. 
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cation of resources in the economy. Specifically, the market mechanism 
for allocating labor among industries and occupations might be impeded 
by the extent to which the policy either imposed similar wage settlements 
across the economy or prevented wage increases from occurring except 
in high productivity or low wage sectors. As indicated above, however, 
the impact of the policy on priées, wages and wage differentials has been 
limited. This is largely because Britain's product and labor markets are 
already quite imperfect with their institutional rigidities making it difficult 
to allocate labor on the basis of differential wages. In addition, Britain's 
highly decentralized price détermination System and the importance of 
wage drift — both of which enable the reassertion of market pressures — 
prevented substantial rigidities in the market mechanism. Finally, several 
important sectors in the economy, especially executive and white collar 
pay levels in the private industry, were not covered by the incomes policy 
and were, therefore, determined by the typical mix of institutional and 
market pressures. Thus, the purely économie costs of the policy seem 
fairly modest, particularly in combination with the modest économie 
gains described above. 
The heaviest non-economic costs imposed by the policy were political. 
As noted above, the British labor movement first accepted an incomes 
policy enthusiastically, but in the late 1960's union support waned signifi-
cantly as the Labour Government implemented stringent monetary and 
fiscal policies and resorted to légal controls for its implementation. While 
the labor movement continued to accept the basic social and économie 
justification for an incomes policy, it could not withstand the wage pressures 
from its grass roots membership or between unions. Even the TUC's own 
incomes policy was seriously weakened by its affiliâtes' opposition as La-
bour's stringent policy produced union distaste for any interférence in 
the collective bargaining process. 
British management also accepted an incomes policy initially, partly 
for reasons of political inevitability, but also because it was an alternative 
to undesirable traditional demand restriction policies and offered a bul-
wark against union wage demands. However, management support also 
has faded, triggered in part by Labour's unwillingness to limit public expen-
ditures, and the extensive impact of wage drift untouched by the policy's 
control mechanisms. The Government's restrictive économie policies and 
failure to support employer résistance to union demands in several key 
negotiations also were factors in managements disillusionment. Thus, this 
review of the policy's political conséquences reinforces the gênerai con-
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clusions reached above ; namely, its success was almost exclusively short-
run, and in a context of économie stringency, continuous union and 
management support for an incomes policy was difficult to obtain in the 
longer term. 
In spite of this mixed expérience, an incomes policy is likely to émerge 
again as one of the Government's gênerai économie policies, although now 
the expectations for its success will be more limited. Partly, this is because 
an incomes policy does hâve real payoffs, even if they are minimal and 
apply mainly in the short term. More importantly, an incomes policy may 
be applied simply because of the absence of other effective and politically 
acceptable anti-inflationary policies. Today, much more than a décade 
ago, a ruthless application of traditional monetary and fiscal policies is 
socially unacceptable and politically disastrous in any more than the short 
term. In addition, an important benefit of a future incomes policy may be 
its educational impact on institutions of Britain's collective bargaining 
System. For example, an encouragement to greater industrial efficiency via 
productivity bargaining was clearly one resuit of Labour's incomes policy. 
And, the achievement of closer linkages between pay and productivity is 
a benefit of incalculable worth to Britain's economy. 
At the end of the décade, incomes policies generally fell out of favour 
or faced severe criticisms both in Western Europe and the United States. 
In spite of annual price and wage increases of approximately 8 and 15 
percent respectively during the last 18 months, the Tories also hâve aban-
doned an incomes policy except for taking a tough line on public sector 
pay claims and urging private sector employers to stand firm in the face 
of large union wage demands. However, faced with rising unemployment 
and a stagnant growth rate, the Conservative's first two budgets hâve 
encouraged a modest reflation. Accordingly, the threat of continued in-
flation remains and further adventures with incomes policy are likely to 
occur, especially if higher levels of unemployment are required to keep 
wage increases within reasonable bounds — the expérience of the late 
1960's — holds true in the future50. Such circumstances will raise the 
political and économie costs of pure monetary and fiscal management and 
increase the appeal of an incomes policy. However, whether the Heat 
Administration will reach a similar policy conclusion remains to be seen. 
50 This changed relationship is noted by Samuel BRITTAN in «Wage Inflation 
and the Labour Market, » The Financial Times (London), January 22, 1970. 
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Some Conclusions 
In the 1960's Britain's collective bargaining System was modified in 
several important respects. What, then, are the implications of thèse 
changes for the future ? Clearly, the major challenges to the System were 
the émergence of informai plant and companywide bargaining in key 
sectors of the economy and the growth of state intervention in industrial 
relations. Nevertheless, as with most British institutions, the pull of history 
is strong ; most of the main features of the system in 1960 had been chang-
ed only moderately by the end of the décade and will be carried on into 
the 1970's. Industrywide bargaining — especially in the public sector, 
multi-occupational unionism in competing jurisdictions, powerful em-
ployer ' associations, limited scope agreements, the wages council system 
and joint consultation will ail be continuing features of the British system 
of industrial relations. Moreover, none of thèse changes has challenged 
fundamentally the traditional British approach of according a priority 
both to collective bargaining over ail other methods of pay détermination 
and to voluntary over compulsory procédural rules for the régulation of 
its conduct. 
The most dramatic innovation of the past décade was the extensive 
modification of Britain's traditional policy of « collective laissez faire » in 
industrial relations with government intervention becoming the rule rather 
than the exception. However, such government initiatives were confined 
largely to the extension of public policy into areas where joint union-
management approaches had failed to respond to the needs of a modem 
industrial society or to encouraging the modemization of voluntary bar-
gaining procédures. A major example of state involvement of the first 
type was the development of an active labor market policy. Its key ingré-
dients were an improved employment service, mobility allowances, wage-
related unemployment benefits and extended government manpower fore-
casting efforts, together with législation on dismissal notification, industrial 
training and severance pay. The second approach is exemplified by govern-
ment intervention in the docks and the automobile, shipping and ship-
building industries to modernize collective bargaining procédures in thèse 
key sectors of the economy through the combined effects of publicity, 
« arm twisting » and pointed recommendations for change. 
Government efforts to establish an incomes policy might appear to 
be an important exception to the kinds of state intervention described 
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above. However, Labour's « Early Warning » reporting system for wage 
and price increases, statutory wage-price controls and the extensive investi-
gatory rôle of the Priées and Incomes Board were never intended to 
replace established bargaining procédures. In fact, the introduction of 
statutory controls and draconic deflationary measures resulted in a serious 
breech between the Wilson Administration and the labor movement, which 
viewed them as a unacceptable intrusion into the collective bargaining 
process. So far the new Conservative Government has declined to resurrect 
an incomes policy as a major ingrédient of its national économie program. 
Nevertheless, as this is written in May, 1971, various proposais to curb 
inflationary wage increases are being pressed on the government, including 
a wage freeze, wage norms tied to the cost of living, taxes levied against 
those firms granting extraordinary wage increase and spécial treatment 
for productivity agreements and low paid workers. How soon the Tories 
respond to thèse calls to re-introduce an incomes policy probably will 
dépend on the success of their current économie policies and whether the 
labor movement will cooperate again in such a policy. However, when, 
and if, the rebirth of an incomes policy occurs, it almost surely will be only 
one élément of a gênerai économie program which strongly emphasizes the 
traditional rôle of monetary and fiscal policy and accepts an essentiaily 
voluntary system of collective bargaining. 
In any event, based on Britain's past expérience, probably the most 
significant impact of an incomes policy will be the reform of voluntary 
bargaining procédures. For example, the emphasis on productivity bargain-
ing in Labour's incomes policy and by the Priées and Incomes Board 
directly encouraged the development of plant and company bargaining. 
Specifically Labour's policy accepted a decentralized bargaining system, 
while seeking its reform through the introduction of systematic procédures, 
rationalized wage structures and closer linkages between pay and pro-
ductivity. And, whatever the form of any future Tory incomes policy, 
their gênerai approaches to the economy and industrial relations are likely 
to work in the same direction. 
Without question, the most far-reaching challenges to « voluntarism » 
in British industrial relations are presented by the proposais for a gênerai 
reform of the system developed initially by the Royal Commission and sub-
sequently by the Labour and Conservative Governments. Because thèse 
proposais hâve provoked such extensive controversy and partisan criti-
cism, it is worth re-emphasizing how much in common they hâve with 
one another. Although varying in their spécifie légal, institutional and 
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procédural recommendations, ail of them hâve affirmed: continued support 
for an essentially voluntary collective bargaining System, while being 
sharply critical of current institutions and procédures ; the necessity to 
codify and up-date Britain's nineteenth century System of labor law ; the 
public review of particular industrial relations problems and practices 
by a Commission on Industrial Relations ; the need for a strong and res-
ponsible labor movement, supported by procédures for union récognition ; 
approval of the development of a comprehensive, coordinated System of 
local bargaining ; and the establishment of procédures to guarantee the 
rights of union members and employées. 
The major points of disagreement, between the Conservative Govern-
ment on the one hand and the Royal Commission and the Wilson Ad-
ministration on the other, were over the rôle of the law as a change agent 
in industrial relations and the relevance of légal restrictions on the right 
to strike. As the Conservative's new Bill is yet to be approved by the 
House of Lords, it is impossible to do more than speculate about its consé-
quences for British industrial relations. However, it is arguable that the 
new légal framework is likely to hâve a more minimal impact on esta-
blished bargaining relationships than many of its critics now assert. In 
my judgment the new Act's most immédiate and dramatic effects will be 
the provision of union récognition in previous non-union situations, the 
régulation of internai union affairs and the protection of the rights of 
individual employées. For, apart from a modest increase in litigation 
arising out of the Conservative's new catégories of " unfair industrial ac-
tions " the use of the law in enforcing relationships between the parties 
probably is likely to be minimal, although the existence of such sanctions 
may modify industrial relations behavior. Particularly, the Tory's use of 
the Act's powers to invoke unilaterally the introduction of legally enfor-
ceable procédure agreements or the national emergency disputes procé-
dures probably will be confined to a few cases. Moreover, in the case 
of national strike ballots and "cooling off" periods, thèse powers may 
hâve limited effects, especially if the United States' expérience is any 
guide. While the most extensive rôle for the law in labor relations may 
resuit from a gênerai introduction of legally binding agreements, such a 
development, as the new law clearly spécifies, can occur only by mutual 
agreement of the parties. 
In the final analysis, therefore, while the Conservative's new Act 
clearly will bring about fundamental changes in British industrial rela-
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tions, any far-reaching reform of collective bargaining must dépend ulti-
mately on the voluntary efforts of both unions and management. Hère the 
major challenge of the 1970's is to face up to the widespread growth of 
informai, uncoordinated plant bargaining procédures. It is generally agreed 
that there is an urgent need throught British industry to devise new ap-
proaches to cope with the problems of union compétition and uncoordi-
nated local bargaining, irrational wage structures, the absence of a linkage 
between pay and industrial efficiency and the non-existence of effective 
joint procédure to résolve plant level disputes. Ultimately thèse problems 
can be met only through an extensive modification in the rôle and func-
tions of both Britain's national unions and employers' associations to 
support, assist and encourage their members to confront them directly. 
Beyond this, of course, both local managements and union représentatives 
must be willing to establish new plant bargaining procédures, a develop-
ment which, hopefully, will be encouraged by the emerging new génération 
of union leaders who hâve had first-hand expérience with the problems 
of plant bargaining and managers committed to the modem principles of 
industrial relations management. 
Clearly, several developments in the last décade do indicate that 
responses to this challenge may be forthcoming. The development of long-
term contracts, status agreements and, particularly, productivity bargaining 
demonstrate the fundamental vitality of the voluntary collective bargaining 
process. Moreover, the récent spate of union amalgamations which has es-
tablished a more influential rôle for gênerai unionism in the building, 
engineering and automobile industries, may provide a more rational union 
structure at plant level. Finally, the willingness of both unions and mana-
gement in the engineering and automobile manufacturing industrie:? to grap-
ple with the problems of bargaining structure, wage structure reform and 
local disputes procédures is another encouraging sign. Nevertheless, so far 
thèse developments are mère straws in the wind; the satisfactory incorpora-
tion of plant bargaining into Britain's industrial relations System is far from 
being accomplished. And, quite apart from the Conservative's new légal 
framework for British industrial relations, a major and urgent need in 
the 1970's is for unions and management to respond to this challenge. The 
widespread failure of traditional institutions and procédures to respond 
to the émergence of plant bargaining was apparent at the beginning of 
the 1960's ; that this failure has now been carried on into the 1970's 
is not only regrettable, but will hâve serious conséquences for the British 
economy, both domestically and in the world industrial arena. 
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Les défis posés à la négociation collective en Angleterre 
La réforme des relations industrielles a été l'un des points saillants lors des 
élections générales de 1970 en Angleterre et l'une des priorités de la société anglaise 
pendant les années 1960. La Commission royale d'enquête sur les syndicats et les 
associations d'employeurs ainsi que les gouvernements conservateur et travailliste 
ont présenté les grandes lignes d'une réforme générale des relations industrielles. 
L'implantation de ces recommandations a amené une intervention croissante de 
l'État et une action positive de la part des parties à la négociation. Il en résulta un 
impact sérieux sur le système traditionnel de négociation collective. 
LE SYSTÈME TRADITIONNEL DE NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Voici très brièvement les principales caractéristiques du système traditionnel 
de négociation collective en Angleterre. 
Les trois quarts des travailleurs sont couverts par la négociation sectorielle. 
Environ 4 millions d'ouvriers voient leurs salaires fixés par des mécanismes 
statuaires. 
Avec 40% des travailleurs syndiqués, le mouvement syndical anglais a une 
structure diversifiée. La plupart des syndiqués sont membres d'un petit nombre de 
grands syndicats dont les 4 plus importants sont des syndicats industriels. 
Du côté patronal, on note la présence de quelque quatorze mille associations 
d'employeurs. 
La convention collective anglaise typique porte sur peu de questions et n'a 
pas de date d'échéance. 
La consultation complète la négociation collective dans plusieurs industries. 
Le système anglais de relations industrielles favorise la négociation collective 
à toute autre méthode de détermination des salaires et les procédures volontaires 
aux procédures obligatoires pour leur application. 
LA CROISSANCE DE LA NÉGOCIATION LOCALE 
La croissance de la négociation locale, depuis 1945, et plus particulièrement 
le phénomène du glissement des salaires et des conditions de travail, ont contribué 
à mettre en question la raison d'être économique et institutionnelle de la négociation 
sectorielle. Cette décentralisation informelle de la structure de la négociation col-
lective a des effets positifs et des conséquences néfastes. Le côté patronal et la 
partie syndicale ont tous deux fait des efforts pour stabiliser la négociation locale. 
Cependant l'absence de réorganisation des structures syndicales au niveau de l'éta-
blissement et l'absence d'une politique efficace du personnel du côté patronal ont 
contribué à transformer la négociation locale en problème majeur de relations in-
dustrielles en Angleterre. 
LE RÔLE DU GOUVERNEMENT 
L'intervention accrue du gouvernement anglais en relations industrielles est 
le changement le plus significatif dans les relations industrielles de ce pays. Durant 
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les années '60. Cette intervention a pris différentes formes : un programme de 
planification économique, une politique des prix et des revenus, des politiques 
fiscale et monétaire et une politique nationale du marché du travail incluant des 
lois sur les préavis de licenciement, la formation professionnelle et les indemnités 
de fin d'emploi. 
INTERVENTION EN NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Cette intervention dans le processus de la négociation collective est largement 
due à la préoccupation du public britannique vis-à-vis un dossier de grèves qui 
laissait beaucoup à désirer. Comme exemples, citons le rôle du ministre de l'Emploi 
et les interventions dans les industries de l'automobile et des ports de mer. Cepen-
dant ces interventions de l'État n'ont généralement pas porté de fruits et ne repré-
sentent pas une stratégie coordonnée de réforme en relations industrielles. C'est 
cependant le reflet de l'abandon du support traditionnel de la prise de décisions 
privée en relations industrielles. 
LE RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION ROYALE ET LES PROGRAMMES 
DE RÉFORME EN RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES 
Depuis 1968, une Commission royale d'enquête et les gouvernements conser-
vateur et travailliste ont fait des recommandations pour une réforme générale en 
relations industrielles. Toutes ces propositions ont beaucoup en commun. Elles sup-
portent, avec différents degrés d'insistance, un système volontaire de négociation 
collective incluant des procédures assurant la reconnaissance syndicale ; une mise 
à jour de la législation anglaise du travail ; le développement d'un système coordonné 
de négociation locale ; l'examen public de pratiques et de problèmes particuliers 
de relations industrielles et l'établissement de procédures protégeant les droits des 
syndiqués et des employés. 
Le principal désaccord entre ces différentes sources de recommandations por-
tait sur l'utilité de la loi comme agent de changement et sur la pertinence des 
sanctions légales vis-à-vis le droit de grève. La Commission royale et le gouverne-
ment travailliste ont rejeté l'usage de sanctions légales en général. Cependant l'ad-
ministration Wilson a proposé d'imposer des restrictions quant au droit de grève, 
mais elles furent abandonnées à la suite de l'opposition soulevée à l'intérieur même 
du parti et du mouvement syndical. D'un autre côté, la proposition des Conservateurs, 
proposition qui va probablement devenir loi durant l'été 1971, vise à rendre les 
conventions collectives semblables à des contrats liant légalement les deux parties 
par accord conjoint. Le programme des Conservateurs permet l'imposition unila-
térale d'accords et prévoit des périodes de « cooling off » et des votes de grève 
dans les situations d'urgence. 
NOUVEAUTÉS EN NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
Il y a eu plusieurs innovations pendant les années '60 : le développement des 
conventions à longue durée, les accords sur la position des syndicats, et des accords 
de productivité. Cette dernière innovation est la plus importante. Elle fut fortement 
supportée par la politique des revenus du gouvernement travailliste. Cependant les 
véritables accords de productivité couvrent seulement un nombre limité d'employés 
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et il fut difficile de réconcilier cette pratique avec les procédures de négociation 
sectorielle. Ces innovations démontrent la vitalité du processus de négociation col-
lective. Mais leur diffusion dans l'industrie britannique pose de nombreux points 
d'interrogation. 
LE DÉFI DE LA POLITIQUE DES REVENUS 
Depuis 1945, tous les gouvernements britanniques ont expérimenté des politi-
ques de revenus. L'époque « moderne » de ces politiques remonte au début des 
années '60, mais elle est surtout caractérisée par l'expérience du gouvernement tra-
vailliste de 1964 à 1970. Cependant la sérieuse crise économique anglaise de la fin 
des années '60 a détruit les politiques de productivité, de prix et de revenus. Le 
National Board for Priées and Incomes a joué un rôle important dans l'administra-
tion des politiques de revenus, surtout par ses recommandations visant des change-
ments spécifiques dans le comportement salaire-prix et par son évaluation critique 
de pratiques importantes de négociation collective en Angleterre. Même s'il est 
encore possible de discuter les effets précis des politiques de revenus du Parti Tra-
vailliste, elles semblent avoir été, avec ses bénéfices économiques plus grands que 
les coûts, un complément utile aux autres politiques économiques. Cependant les 
coûts politiques substantiels restreignent les bénéfices économiques d'une telle poli-
tique à la courte période. Le nouveau Parti Conservateur a rejeté à date une politique 
formelle des revenus. Mais une telle approche peut renaître à cause des coûts éco-
nomiques et politiques des stratégies anti-inflationnistes. 
CONCLUSION 
Le système britannique de négociation collective a été modifié durant les 
années '60 par l'émergence de la négociation locale informelle et par l'intervention 
accrue de l'État. Cependant on retrouvera encore durant les années 70 la plupart 
des caractéristiques de la structure britannique traditionnelle en négociation col-
lective. Même les efforts d'implantation des politiques de revenus ne visaient aucu-
nement à remplacer la négociation collective et son effet le plus possible en longue 
période sera d'en arriver à une réforme des procédures volontaires. 
La nouvelle loi des relations industrielles des Conservateurs va grandement 
changer le cadre des relations industrielles en Angleterre. Mais nous croyons qu'elle 
n'aura qu'un impact minimal sur les relations de négociation déjà établies. Ultime-
ment, toute réforme d'envergure en relations industrielles dépend de la volonté des 
parties à faire face aux changements des années '70. Un échec sur ce plan aura des 
conséquences graves pour l'économie britannique. 
